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Protection of Intellectual Property-Patent,
Copyright, and Trade Secret Law in the United
States and Abroad
Andrew G. Rodau *
I. Introduction
Intellectual property law is an old' and highly specialized body
of law that protects original ideas, creative forms of expression, new
discoveries or inventions, and trade secrets. This body of law is pre-
mised on the idea that to encourage innovation, 2 persons responsi-
ble for such advances should be rewarded. The rewards provided
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I One very early patent was granted in Venice in 1469 for book printing. Prager, A
History of Intellectual Propertyfrom 1545 to 1787, 26J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 711, 715 (1944). For
an English translation of this patent, see id. at 750.
Many patents and copyrights were granted in Venice in the 1500s. Id. at 716. Trade
secrecy was used as early as the 1300s to protect an improved method of making silk
thread that afforded users a commercial advantage over competitors. Prager, The Early
Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 106, 120-21 (1952).
Trade secret law and practice also existed in Roman times. Jorda, International Trade
Secret Protection (Protecting Trade Secrets 1983) 157 P.L.I. PAT., COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS
AND Lrr. PROP. HANDBOOK SERIES 207 (1983). Furthermore, trade secret law is an old part
of English common law. 2 A. Wisp, TRADE SECRET AND KNow-How THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD, § 2.01 (1981).
In the United States, patent law is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982), and copy-
right law is codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). Trade secret law is a function of state
common law and some statutory enactments. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 757 comment a (1939); Uniform Trade Secret Act §§ 1-11, 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980)
(adopted in Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, and
Washington).
2 One of the main purposes of the patent system is to encourage disclosure for the
purpose of increasing public knowledge. A. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON PATENT LAW 7 (2d ed. 1981); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81
(1974). See also Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970), on re-
mand, 316 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Miss.), afd, 444 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1971) (patent law
establishes monopoly to encourage invention). Although the primary purpose of copy-
right law is often stated to be that of securing creative advances to the public, see I M.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.03[A] at 1-30 to 1-30.1 (1983), this is achieved by providing
rewards as incentives to creators. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
774, 782 (1984). See also Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (Congress may re-
ward authors and inventors to encourage intellectual and artistic creations). The policies
behind trade secret law are the encouragement of invention and the maintenance of com-
mercial morality. Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 79 I11. 2d 475, 477, 404
N.E.2d 205, 207 (1980).
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are limited monopolies accorded by patent 3 and copyright 4 laws and
protection of business "know-how" by trade secret law.5
Although American jurisprudence generally has an aversion to
monopolies and the restriction of free enterprise,6 the limited excep-
tions embodied in intellectual property law have early beginnings in
the American legal system.7 The founding fathers of the United
States understood the need for some limitations on free enterprise
to stimulate new ideas and scientific and artistic creativity.8 There-
fore, they included a clause in the Constitution that expressly al-
lowed Congress to grant exclusive rights for limited times to authors
and inventors.9
The need for protection of intellectual property is critical today
because of the increased competition in both foreign and domestic
markets.10 The economic benefits of technological innovations that
3 The patent law grants exclusive rights in an invention or discovery for 17 or 14
years. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173 (1982).
4 The copyright law provides exclusive rights in original works of authorship for the
life of the author plus 50 years and for terms of up to 100 years in certain cases. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302 (1982).
5 Trade secret protection generally lasts for as long as the protected information is
secret. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
6 See generally Laskey, The Patent Law--A Step Child in Its Own House?, 7 PAT. L. REV. 13
(1975) (criticism of use of antitrust laws to diminish value of patents). For a general dis-
cussion of the tension between antitrust and patent law, see Levine, The Shrunken Patent
Domain in the Expanded Anti-trust Universe, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 436 (1952). But see R.
NORDHAUS & E.JUROW, PATENT-ANTITRUST LAw 3 (1961), which notes both the granting of
exclusive rights in some inventions and the passage of laws barring monopolies in the
early American colonies. The judiciary's hostile view toward patents is illustrated byJus-
tice Jackson's statement, "the only patent that is valid is one which this court [Supreme
Court] has not been able to get its hands on."Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S.
560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7 In 1672 the colony of Massachusetts prohibited the making of reprints without the
consent of the owner of the copy, and Connecticut allowed patent monopolies in certain
circumstances. In addition, the colonial congress adopted state copyright statutes.
Prager, supra note 1, at 737-38.
8 See generally Forman, Two Hundred Years of American Patent Law, in Two HUNDRED
YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAw 26-28 (1977)
(brief history of the constitutional power to protect writings and discoveries adopted as
part of the Constitution).
9 The Constitution states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the pro-
gress of science in useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
10 See Comment, Legislation: President Proposes Antitrust Reforms in Attempt To Promote In-
novation, 26 PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 646, at 445 (Sept. 15, 1983)
(President urged Congress to modify intellectual property laws to improve ability of Amer-
ican industries to compete in international marketplace). See also H.R. REP. No. 1307, part
1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6460-61
(increased protection of new technology needed to increase productivity of American in-
dustries to make them more competitive with foreign companies).
The protection of intellectual property has an effect on the economic development of
our country. Gambrell, Overview of Ownership Conflicts that Arise with Respect to Intellectual
Property, in SORTING OUT THE OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A GUIDE TO
PRACTICAL COUNSELING IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 10-12 (1980). The need to protect in-
tellectual property is evidenced by the fact that the cost of stolen technology to private
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result from research and development programs are quickly lost if
intellectual property laws are not used aggressively. This problem is
especially evident in the area of computer technology. One company
may invest heavily in the development of computer chips or software
only to find other companies copying the chips or software and sell-
ing them at greatly reduced prices because they do not have develop-
ment costs to recoup." This competition, especially from foreign
companies, has raised tremendous interest in intellectual property
law. This has caused unprecedented congressional and administra-
tive action to improve intellectual property protection. 12
Intellectual property law consists of federal and state statutory
law and state common law and has been divided into three areas:
patent law, copyright law, and trade secret law. Each area is dis-
cussed separately in this article, and different types of available pro-
tection are compared to demonstrate their relative advantages and
weaknesses and to aid in determining the type of protection appro-
priate in a particular situation.
I. Patent Law
Patent law, which is exclusively federal law, allows the federal
government to grant a patent to an inventor through the United
States Patent and Trademark Office.' 3 A patent is the grant of exclu-
business in the United States is $20 billion a year. Hofer, Business Warfare over Trade Secrets,
9 LITIGATION 8 (1983).
11 See Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works, reprinted in 3 COMPUTER L.J. 53, 58 (1981-82) (cost of developing computer pro-
grams greatly exceeds the cost of their duplication) [hereinafter cited as Final Report]. See
also 29 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 705, at 28 (Nov. 15, 1984) (White
House statement indicated cost of creating and marketing chips can be tens of millions of
dollars, while others can copy these chips at a fraction of these costs).
12 A new copyright act became effective January 1, 1978. See The Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-702 (1982)). The
Copyright Act was amended to clarify protection for computer software. See Computer
Software Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § l0(a)-(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)). In addition, the Act was amended with regard
to copyright royalties for rental of sound recordings. See Record Rental Amendment, Pub.
L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984).
Patent law was also amended recently. See Patent Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-622, 98 Stat. 3383. See also Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. Several additional amendments to the patent
law have also been enacted. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (1982)); Pub. L. No. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317
(1982) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (1982)). See also 37 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1 to 1.570 (1983) (revised regulations of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office). A new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals from all federal district courts, was established. See Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. Finally, a new type of intellectual
property protection has been enacted to protect semiconductor chips. See The Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (adding a new
chapter 9 to 17 U.S.C.).
13 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982).
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sive property rights for a limited time to prevent others from making,
using, or selling the patent owner's invention in the United States.' 4
In return for these rights, a description of the invention is published
and made publicly available.' 5 The underlying rationale of patent
law is the creation of a public contract under which the inventor dis-
closes his invention to the world in return for exclusive rights in the
invention for a limited time. 16 The potential benefits arising from
issuance of a patent on scientific and technological advances encour-
ages such advances. 17
Three types of patents may be granted under patent law: plant
patents, which protect certain types of asexually reproducing
plants;' 8 design patents, which protect ornamental designs;' 9 and
utility patents, which protect the underlying idea embodied in the
invention. 20
Plant patents can be granted for the invention or discovery of an
asexually reproducing plant.2 ' This patent gives the owner "the
right to exclude others from asexually reproducing the plant or sell-
ing or using the plant so reproduced. '22
Design patents can be obtained for articles of manufacture that
embody new and original ornamental designs. 23 The test to deter-
mine if the design is new is whether the average observer would con-
sider the design to be new as opposed to being merely a modification
of an existing design. 24 In addition, the design must represent more
14 Id. § 154. It is important to note that a United States patent is without extraterrito-
rial effect.
15 For the type of description of the invention that must be contained in a patent, see
id. §§ 112, 113.
16 Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1978).
17 See A. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, supra note 2, at 77; 12A R. MILGRIM, BusINESS ORGA-
NIZATIONS, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 9.02[1], at 9-14 (1984).
18 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1982). Although sexually reproduced plants are explicitly ex-
cluded from patent protection, the Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84
Stat. 1542 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-574, 94 Stat. 3350 (1980) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1982)), provides "patent-like" protection for sexually
reproduced plants. The Act also provides for the issuance of certificates of plant variety
protection, which entitle the plant breeder to exclude others from selling, offering for sale,
reproducing, importing, exporting, or using the protected plant in producing another va-
riety for 18 years from the issuance of the certificate. 7 U.S.C. § 2483 (1982). The Act is
very similar to the patent law but it is administered by the Plant Variety Protection Office
which is part of the Department of Agriculture. Id. § 2321. For general information about
this Act, see H.R. REP. No. 1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprzntedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5082 (legislative history of Act); 1 P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS,
§ 6.01[6], at 60-22 (2d ed. 1984).
19 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982).
20 Id. §§ 101-103. These sections set forth the statutory requirements for a utility
patent.
21 Id. § 161.
22 Id. § 163. These rights last for 17 years from the issuance of a patent. Id. § 154.
23 Id. § 171. The term of a design patent is 14 years. For a general discussion of
design patents, see 1 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, § 6.01[5], at 6-25 to 6-31.
24 Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 494 F.2d 383, 389 (6th Cir. 1974).
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than the skill of the average designer.25 A mere change in finish,
labor, or workmanship is not sufficient to meet this requirement, 26
and judicial decisions have disallowed patent protection for designs
that are merely simulative of known objects. 27
Utility patents are the most widely sought and most valuable
type of patents. To qualify for protection under a utility patent, an
invention must be new or novel. 28 Only one patent can be issued for
a single invention even if several people independently invent the
same thing.29 Thus, the inventor generally must be the first person
to invent the subject matter of the patent.30
The term "invention" is a term of art with a distinct legal mean-
ing.3' The inventor must conceive3 2 the idea, generally by creating
written notes or diagrams, or by actual experiments. This concep-
tion then must be transformed into an actual working prototype of
the invention that is tested or used in the intended environment
before an invention exists within the legal definition.33 The con-
struction and utilization of the invention is known as "actual reduc-
tion to practice." 3 4 "Constructive reduction to practice," generally
defined as the filing of a patent application, also satisfies the defini-
tion of an invention, even though the invention may never actually
25 Hygienic Specialities Co. v. H.G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614, 617 (2d Cir. 1962).
26 See, e.g., In re Hall, 69 F.2d 660, 661 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (new blending or arrangement
of colors alone is not patentable).
27 See, e.g., Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 679 (1893) (paper weight or
ink stand that is a copy of well known building not patentable).
28 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1982).
29 See id. § 135. For regulations used by the Patent and Trademark Office to deter-
mine who the first inventor is for purposes of determining who is entitled to receive a
patent, see 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.201 to 1.2088 (1983).
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c), (g) (1982) (first inventor may lose right to apply for a patent
if invention is abandoned, suppressed, or concealed). Although only the first inventor nor-
mally can obtain a patent on an invention, in some cases a subsequent inventor may obtain
a patent on the same invention. An invention that is kept secret and eventually abandoned
may be considered "lost art" that will not bar a subsequent inventor from getting a patent
even though the later inventor is not the first inventor. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10
How.) 477, 496-98 (1850).
31 Invention requires both conception, which is the complete mental act of formulat-
ing the invention, and reduction to practice, which is actually constructing and using the
invention. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 802-03 (S.D.
Tex. 1983). See also Rex Chain Belt, Inc. v. Borg-Warner, 477 F.2d 481, 487 (7th Cir.
1973).
32 "In general, conception is the mental activity of inventing or the creation or dis-
covery and the new idea in a specific tangible means or way of carrying out the new idea."
R. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, supra note 2, at 117.
33 Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1963) (general
rule requires tests under actual working conditions). See also Paine v. Inoue, 195 U.S.P.Q.
598, 604 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1976) (must show invention is workable under actual conditions it is
intended to operate under).
34 R. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, supra note 2, at 118; Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem.
Corp., 276 U.S. 358 (1928), cited in Farmhand v. Lanham Mfg. Co., 192 U.S.P.Q. 749, 756
(D.S.D. 1976) ("reduction to practice contemplates an actual and complete use of the par-
ticular invention for its intended purpose").
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have been built or tested in any form.3 5
For a new invention to be deemed patentable it also must be
useful.36 This is referred to as the utility requirement and requires
that the invention accomplish at least one of its objectives3 7 regard-
less of how well it meets this objective or whether the invention is
commercially desirable or profitable.38 In actual practice the utility
requirement is almost always met as long as some use is evident.a9
The rejection of an invention on lack of utility grounds is reserved in
most cases for devices purporting to be perpetual motion machines
because such devices are inherently inoperative, and therefore, lack
usefulness. 40
Congress has limited patentable inventions to those that fall
within certain specific statutory classes. To be patentable, an inven-
tion must be a "process," "machine," "manufacture," "composition
of matter," or an "improvement" of something within the aforemen-
tioned classes. 4 1 Generally, a process is a tangible method compris-
ing a series of steps or acts that are used to transform or change
some particular subject matter. An example of a typical process is a
novel series of steps for curing rubber in an industrial plant. 4 2 A
machine generally is a structure or device, such as a sewing machine,
that incorporates moving parts.43 A composition of matter results
from the uniting of two or more ingredients, either chemically or
physically, to produce a new and homogeneous mass. This new
composition of matter can be a new chemical compound or a new
living organism.44 Finally, a manufacture is any tangible object made
by man other than a machine or composition of matter.45
It is rarely necessary to know precisely which class an invention
35 See Solvex Corp. v. Freeman, 199 U.S.P.Q. 797, 805 (W.D. Va. 1976) (invention
need not be actually constructed and used to be patentable); Exparte Frank, 191 U.S.P.Q.
412, 413 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1975) (filing of application is constructive reduction to
practice).
36 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
37 Decker v. FTC, 176 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 878 (1949).
38 1 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, § 8.03, at 8-7 (economic or commercial value of
invention not relevant to utility). See generally International Glass Co. v. United States, 159
U.S.P.Q. 434, 440-41 n.8 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (successful reduction to practice establishes exist-
ence of invention without regard to commercial use of invention).
39 See, e.g., Exparte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 802 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1977) (in many
states even illegal use satisfies the utility requirement).
40 See Technitrol Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1978) (device has no utility if it does not work).
41 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1982) (bars obtaining a pat-
ent on an otherwise patentable invention "which is useful solely in the utilization of special
nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon").
42 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
43 Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 531, 570-71 (1863).
44 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-11 (1980).
45 In American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931), a "manufac-
ture" was defined as an article produced from raw or prepared materials as a result of
giving such materials new forms, qualities, or properties.
542 [VOL. 10
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
falls within as long as it clearly falls within at least one class. Judicial
decisions, however, have placed specific limitations on the above
statutory classes and have made it clear that mere printed matter, 46
scientific principles, 47 things naturally occurring in nature,48 mental
processes, mathematical algorithms, 49 and methods of doing busi-
ness50 are not included, and therefore, are not patentable.
For an invention that is new, useful, and within a statutory class
to be deemed patentable, it must represent more than the exercise of
the ordinary skill normally associated with the person working in the
field of the invention. 5 1 The required level of skill may vary depend-
ing upon the type of invention involved. In the field of electronics,
for example, the level of ordinary skill may be very high because
highly trained electronics engineers usually are employed. The level
of skill may be lower in the field of chair design because the average
person working in this field typically is less highly skilled. 52 This
level of inventiveness requirement, which is referred to as the "non-
obvious requirement," is in practice the major hurdle that separates
patentable from nonpatentable inventions.53 The actual require-
ment for the level of inventiveness or nonobviousness appears in a
single section of the patent law:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be nega-
tived by the manner in which the invention was made.54
A landmark Supreme Court decision 55 established the following
procedure for applying the nonobvious requirement: (1) the scope
and content of the prior art56 in the field of the invention is deter-
46 Conover v. Coe, 90 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (arrangement of printed matter
not patentable).
47 Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (scientific truth
not patentable).
48 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 583, 593 (1978) (discovery of law of nature not
patentable).
49 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (mathematic formula by itself not patentable).
50 Conover, 99 F.2d at 379 (method of doing business not patentable).
51 The Greening Nursery Co. v.J & R Tool and Mfg. Co., 153 U.S.P.Q. 660, 662 (8th
Cir. 1967).
52 Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229 (1976) (must look to person reasonably
skilled in an applicable art); Robbins Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 554 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th
Cir. 1977) (finds level of skill for mining engineers high since typical engineer has four
years of college training in engineering).
53 The importance of the nonobviousness requirement and the difficulty of applying
it is evidenced by entire books written on this requirement. See, e.g., J. WITHERSPOON,
NONOBVIOUSNEss-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (1980).
54 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
55 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
56 Prior art is a technical term that describes the body of knowledge the person
skilled in the field of the invention is held to know: It generally includes technical knowl-
edge normally possessed by someone skilled in the field, and issued patents, books, and
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mined; (2) the difference between the prior art and the invention
sought to be patented is determined; (3) the level of ordinary skill at
the time of invention in the field of the invention is determined; and
(4) finally, the invention is found to be obvious or nonobvious, as a
matter of law, based upon the above determinations. The determi-
nation of the scope and content of the prior art, the difference be-
tween prior art and the invention in question, and the level of
ordinary skill in the field are all questions of fact,57 which often are
established by expert testimony.58 The ultimate question of obvi-
ousness, however, is a question of law based upon the previously de-
termined factual determinations.59
Other factors, commonly referred to as "secondary considera-
tions," such as long-felt need, commercial success, failure of others,
the number of unsuccessful efforts by others, whether success came
independently to several inventors at about the same time, syner-
gism, and the extent to which the invention supplanted what had
gone before, are always relevant to the issue of obviousness. 60
Pragmatically, these considerations are the most important factors
for convincing the United States Patent and Trademark Office or a
court that an invention is not obvious. Although the reliance and
appropriate use of secondary considerations has been disputed
widely by courts and commentators, recent decisions have stated cat-
egorically that these secondary considerations are always relevant in
an obviousness determination. 6 1
Despite the existence of an otherwise patentable invention, cer-
tain statutory limitations exist that may bar the issuance of a patent.
If the invention is publicly available or accessible, or actually used in
other publicly available documents that are relevant to the field of the invention even if not
actually known by someone skilled in the field. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGU-
LATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 891 (1979).
See also Union Carbide Corp. v. American Can Co., 220 U.S.P.Q 584, 588 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (inventor presumed to know all art in his field of endeavor and only art from other
fields that is reasonably pertinent to his invention). Prior art includes patents that an in-
ventor with ordinary skill in the art would be aware of. Id. at 591 & n.6; In re Van
Wanderham, 378 F.2d 981, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (inventor held to know only information
in relevant fields rather than information in all fields).
57 Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 548 F.2d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 1977);
Parker v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 1975).
58 Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 395 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935
(1968).
59 Parker, 524 F.2d at 531; Tokyo Shibaura, 548 F.2d at 93. See also Union Carbide, 220
U.S.P.Q. at 589.
60 Graham, 383 U.S. at 717-18 (secondary considerations may have relevance as indi-
cia of obviousness or nonobviousness); Union Carbide, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 591 (obviousness
determination requires consideration of all evidence including secondary considerations).
61 Compare In re Lange, 228 F.2d 245 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (commercial success can be
relied on to establish patentability only when it is an otherwise doubtful case) with
Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and In re Sernaker, 702
F.2d 989 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (evidence of secondary considerations, when present, always
must be considered with regard to obviousness).
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public at least once in the United States before the date of the inven-
tion by someone other than the inventor, the inventor is not entitled
to a patent.62 Actual knowledge by the inventor of this prior public
availability or use by someone else is not relevant. Prior public use
or availability outside the United States of which the inventor is una-
ware will not prevent issuance of a patent. If a description of the
invention has been published anywhere in the world or if any country
has issued a patent for the invention prior to the inventor's date of
invention, however, a patent cannot be obtained. 63 Additionally,
seeking a foreign patent before applying for a United States patent
may prevent issuance of a patent in the United States. 64
Although the first inventor is usually entitled to a patent, a sub-
sequent inventor may become entitled to the patent if the first inven-
tor failed either to construct the invention diligently or to file a
patent application. 65 This rule encourages prompt filing of patent
applications to ensure rapid disclosure of inventions to the public.
The encouragement to file is very strong because lack of diligence
may lead to forfeiture of the right to file a patent application. Fi-
nally, an inventor must file a patent application within one year of
any public use, sale, or published description of the invention. 66
These restrictions ensure prompt filing of patent applications to in-
crease the public's knowledge as quickly as possible while limiting
the duration of the monopoly granted to an inventor. 67
The procedure for obtaining a patent involves several general
steps. Usually a patent attorney or agent 68 will draft a short written
description with accompanying diagrams that describes the inven-
tion. A patent search will be conducted to determine if the invention
is in fact new or if other similar ideas or products exist that woiuld
negate the patentability of the invention.69 Initially, a patent search
62 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (a
single well-defined case of public use is all that is required to establish public use).
63 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
64 Id. § 102(d). See also id. § 185, which bars issuance of U.S. patent if a foreign patent
is applied for without first procuring a filing license for such foreign filing under 35 U.S.C.
§ 184 (1982).
65 Id. § 102(g).
66 Id. § 102(b).
67 See generally Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d
516, 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946) (concealment of invention will result in
loss of right to get patent); International Glass, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 440-41 (completed invention
is abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if it is not subject of patent application or public
disclosure within reasonable time after completion).
68 To represent clients before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, one must have a
technical background and pass an examination given twice a year by the Patent and Trade-
mark Office. After passing the exam the representative will be registered as a patent attor-
ney if he is also an attorney, or as a patent agent if he is not an attorney. 37 C.F.R. § 1.341
(1983).
69 See Ollerenshaw, How To Perform a Patent Search: A Step by Step Guide for the Inventor,
73 L. LIBRARYJ. I (1980) (describes how to perform a manual patent search). See also W.
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will involve an examination of issued United States patents, compris-
ing over four million patents to date, which are classified into numer-
ous categories known as classes and subclasses.
The search can also be extended to foreign patents, technical
journals, and any other publicly accessible information sources. Tra-
ditionally, searches are limited to United States patents because of
cost and inaccessibility. The ubiquity of computer-assisted research,
however, has resulted in improved search capability at a reduced
cost. Computer databases, available for every conceivable area of
technology, are easily searched in minutes via any small computer
linked to the database by a telephone.' 0
The patent attorney or agent and the inventor evaluate search
results to determine the merits of proceeding with filing a patent ap-
plication. If appropriate, a patent application may be drafted by the
patent attorney or agent. This application will contain various sec-
tions and drawings that describe the invention and teach someone
who is skilled in the art how to use the invention. 71 The application
will conclude with patent "claims," which are highly specialized
statements that legally define the metes and bounds of the invention
for which patent protection is sought.72
KONOID, B. TrrrEL, D. FREI & D. STALLARD, WHAT EvERY ENGINEER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
PATENTS 17-23 (1979) (describes types of patent searches).
70 Access to information about a myriad of technical databases and databases con-
taining patents are available from the following companies: Dialog Information Services,
Inc., 3460 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, Cal. 94304; System Development Corporation,
2500 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, Cal. 90406; Bibliographic Retrieval Services, 1200
Route 7, Latham, N.Y. 12110; and Mead Data Central, 200 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.
10166.71 For the mandatory description and drawings of a patent application, see 35 U.S.C.
§§ 112, 113 (1982). See also W. KONOID, supra note 69, at 24-28 (describes briefly how a
patent application is prepared and what it contains).
72 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982). See also Cohen, The Patent Monopoly: What and Why, in PAT-
ENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND TRADE SECRETS FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL AND GEN-
ERAL PRACTITIONERS 20 (1979).
A claim is written in a highly stylized format, as illustrated by the following claim for
an improved finger-operated pump sprayer such as the type used on a bottle of hair spray:
In a closure assembly for an open-top [sic] container having a perforated cap
over said open top thereof mounting a spray unit including a barrel provided
with a tubular extension passing coaxially upwardly through the perforation
in said cap, a plunger reciprocably carried by the barrel and normally ex-
tending therebeyond and a spray head on the upper head of the plunger
above said extension, the combination with said spray unit of an annular re-
tainer telescoped over and secured to the extension above said cap and pro-
vided with external, circumferentially disposed screw threads and an annular,
continuous segment at the upper part of the retainer above said screw
threads, and a cup-shaped hold-down member housing the head and holding
the plunger depressed at substantially the innermost path of travel thereof
within the barrel, said member being provided with internal screw threads
complementally engaging said screw threads on the retainer and having an
internal, circumferentially extending, continuous shoulder disposed to en-
gage said segment around the entire periphery thereof and thereby present a
liquid-tight seal located between the spray head and said threads on the re-
tainer and said member respectively, said shoulder being spaced from the
lower annular peripheral edge of the member a distance at least slightly less
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Once the application is received and executed by the inventor, it
is filed in the United States Patent Trademark Office in Washington,
D.C. It is reviewed to determine if all required parts are included, 73
and it is ultimately assigned to a patent examiner in the Patent and
Trademark Office who performs a search. 74 Based on this search
and on the provisions of the patent law, the examiner issues a written
report, called an office action, which grants a patent on the invention
or states the reason for rejection of the application. 75 Depending
upon the area of technology involved, it typically takes anywhere
from six months to two years for an initial office action to be issued.
If the office action rejects the patent application, the application
may be amended and arguments presented in person and in writing
to persuade the patent examiner to grant a patent. 76 The examiner
will issue a final office action in response to these arguments and
amendments within three months to a year. Such action will allow
the issuance of a patent or explain the reason for rejecting the appli-
cation again. 77 An administrative hearing may be obtained before
the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals upon final rejec-
tion for review of the examiner's decision. 78 Judicial review in the
federal courts is subsequently available, and certiorari to the
Supreme Court is possible in an appropriate case.79
Once a patent issues, it is published and publicly available. 80
The inventor or patent owner has the right for seventeen years from
the date of issue to prevent anyone from making, using, or selling
the invention within the United States.8 1 The seventeen-year mo-
than the distance from the portion of said segment normally engaged by said
shoulder, to the proximal upper surface of the cap whereby said lower edge
of the member is maintained out of contacting relationship with the cap
when the member is on the retainer in a position with said shoulder in tight
sealing engagement with the segment.
Claim I from United States patent 2,870,943 issued on January 27, 1959, reprinted in R.
CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, supra note 2, at 91-92. SeeJ. LANDIS, MECHANICS OF CLAIM DRAFT-
ING (2d ed. 1974) for a detailed description of how patent claims are drafted.
73 See sample patent application in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND TRADE
SECRETS FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL AND GENERAL PRACTITIONERS 660-79 (1979).
74 R. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, supra note 2, at 587-88. See generally W. KONOID, supra
note 69, at 29-33 (describes the handling of a patent by the U.S. Patents and Trademark
Office).
75 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-132 (1982). See W. KONOID, supra note 69, at 30.
76 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1982); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111, 1.133 (1983). See W. KONOID, supra
note 69, at 30-32.
77 37 C.F.R. § 1.113 (1983).
78 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1982); 37 C.F.R. 99 1.191 to 1.198 (1983) (procedure before
Board of Appeals). See also W. KONOID, supra note 69, at 32.
79 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1982) (appeal to Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); id.
§ 145 (appeal to U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia). See also 37 C.F.R.
§§ 1.301, 1.303 (1983).
80 See W. KONOID, supra note 69, at 32. See also Cohen, supra note 72, at 21. For copy
of a U.S. patent issued for gunpowder charge and projectile container, see 1 P. ROSEN-
BERG, supra note 18, app. A3 to A7.
81 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
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nopoly is a negative monopoly entitling the patent owner to prevent
others from using the invention. It does not automatically give the
right to freely use the invention if the use of another patented inven-
tion is involved. This distinction is important in the case of a pat-
ented improvement to an existing patented invention where use of
the improvement necessitates use of the underlying invention. In
this situation the owner of the improvement patent can prevent any-
one from making use of the improvement, but the owner of the im-
provement cannot use his patent abscnt permission of the owner of
the underlying patent.8 2 Additionall), ihe right to enforce the nega-
tive monopoly begins when a patent issues, not when a patent appli-
cation is filed.8 3 Although many inventions include notices, such as
"patent pending" or "patent applied for," such notices do not le-
gally bar anyone from copying or using the invention.8 4
A significant limitation of United States patent law is that it is
without extraterritorial effect. 85 Therefore, if a product is useful
outside the United States, a foreign patent application should be
filed in those foreign countries where marketing potential exists.8 6
Although patent law of most countries contains numerous similari-
ties, United States patent law has certain unique aspects. First,
United States patent law permits an application to be filed within one
year of public disclosure of an invention.8 7 Most foreign jurisdic-
tions, however, do not allow a patent to issue once any public disclo-
sure of the invention has occurred.8 8 Additionally, many foreign
countries publish filed patent applications and allow anyone to ad-
vance valid reasons opposing the issuance of a patent.89 The United
States, however, maintains all patent proceedings in absolute secrecy
82 See W. KONOID, supra note 69, at 3. Assume X gets the first patent on a stool that
has a seat and four legs. Then Y gets a patent on an improved stool that has a seat, four
legs, and a chair back. Y can use his patent to prevent anyone from making, using, or
selling a stool that has a seat, four legs, and a chair back, but Y cannot make, use, or sell
the stool covered by his patent, because it will infringe X's patent. Id.
83 1 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, § 1.02, at 1-5.
84 R. WINCOR & I. MANDELL, COPYRIGHT, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS: THE PROTEC-
TION OF INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 43 (1980) (these notices simply inform
the public that a patent application has been filed; legally enforceable patent rights do not
arise until a patent has actually been granted). See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1982) (use of these
notices to deceive public when no application has been filed can result in a fine of up to
$500).
85 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (patent grants the "right to exclude others from making,
using or selling the invention throughout the United States").
86 2 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, § 18.04, at 18-7. It should be noted, however, that
just because a patent is granted in one country does not mean that it would be granted in
another country, since countries have their own national patent systems.
87 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
88 Landis & Fanwick, Foreign Patents, Ill P.L.I. PAT., COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND
LIT. PROP. HANDBOOK SERIES 331, 335 (1979).
89 2 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, § 19.02[21, at 19-25. For example, Japan publishes
patent applications within eighteen months of filing and the public can present informa-
tion to patent office in opposition to patent application.
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up to the point of patent issuance. 90
Despite the obvious advantages of obtaining patent protection,
serious problems exist with the use of patent law. The United States
Patent and Trademark Office typically takes several years to issue a
patent,9' and despite serious efforts to reduce this time period, the
ultimate goal of an eighteen-month pendency is still inadequate. 92
This delay can render an issued patent worthless. In the field of elec-
tronics and software, for example, technical advances are so rapid
that a product may be obsolete by the time a patent issues. Addition-
ally, the extensive cost of obtaining a patent limits the ability of solo
inventors to seek patent protection for new innovations. 93 The costs
for large corporations can also be extensive because international
business dealings may require that patent protection be sought in
many countries in addition to the United States. 94
In the past the various courts of appeals have had disparate in-
terpretations of the patent law.9 5 Because the Supreme Court rarely
agrees to hear patent cases, this led to uncertainty in the enforce-
ment of patent law. The future of patent law in the United States
looks very promising, however, since Congress has attempted to en-
sure uniformity by granting appellate jurisdiction for all patent mat-
ters to a single federal court.96
Ill. Copyright Law
Copyright is a form of legal protection authorized by the Consti-
90 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982).
91 The interim between filing a patent application and issuance of a patent is almost
three years. Bender, Computer Software Licensing (Protecting Trade Secrets 1983) 157 P.L.I.
PAT., COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND Lrr. PROP. HANDBOOK SERIES 405, 424 (1983).
92 Despite modernization of the Patent and Trademark Office and resulting increases
in efficiency, the deputy commissioner of patents and trademarks has indicated that the
goal of the office is to achieve an eighteen-month pendency for applications by 1987. Con-
ference Reviews; PTO Rule Changes, 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 649, at
507 (Oct. 6, 1983).
93 See Bender, supra note 91, at 424 n.l (cost of obtaining a patent can be as high as
one hundred thousand dollars).
94 See, e.g., 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 9.02[7][a], at 9-51 (to obtain patent
protection of a moderately complex electronic invention in key industrial foreign nations
could cost up to fifty thousand dollars).
95 See, e.g., Note, Patent Law--Estoppel-Doctrine of Licensee Estoppel Overruled; State Protec-
tion of Unpatented Inventions Questioned, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 386, 397 n.59 (1970). See also 12A
R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 9.02[9][iii], at 9-54 (Eighth Circuit invalidated most patents
litigated before it, while Third Circuit favored patents).
96 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (newly
established Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent
appeals from United States district courts). Prior to this Act, United States courts of ap-
peals disagreed over many patent law issues. Compare Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294, 300
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930 (1974) (obviousness is question of fact) with Swofford,
395 F.2d at 367-68 (obviousness is question of law). This difference has been resolved by
the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Union Carbide, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 589
(obviousness is question of law).
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tution97 which protects the form of expression of certain types of
original works of authorship, such as books, music, artistic creations,
sound recordings, or computer software. 98 The underlying purpose
of copyright is the belief that a grant to authors of some exclusive
rights in their works will give them an incentive to create, and the
public will be enriched.99
The basic distinction between patent and copyright protection
lies in the scope and extent of protection and the difficulty in ob-
taining each type of protection. Copyright protects only the form of
expressing an explanation, idea, system, or artistic creation; patent
protection may extend to an embodiment of the underlying idea or
system.' 0 0 Despite its limits, copyright protection is established au-
tomatically once property within the copyright law is created. 10 ' In
contrast, patent protection is obtained only after the lengthy and
costly process of filing and pursuing a patent application to
issuance. 102
Prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976103 a dual
system of copyright protection existed in the United States.' 0
4
Under this dual system state common law copyright applied prior to
97 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) for the subject matter covered by copyright.
99 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 806-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 782 (creative
advances are secured to public by providing rewards to creators as incentives to create);
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555 (Congress may reward authors to encourage intellectual and
artistic creations).
100 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954). See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982)
(copyright does not extend to underlying ideas); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
56, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5670 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT 1476] ("copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information
revealed by the author's work").
The distinction between protecting the form of expression as opposed to the underly-
ing idea can best be understood by example. Assume a book explains a novel method of
building a solar collector to heat water. The form of expression protected by copyright
prohibits someone from photocopying the book. The underlying information that consti-
tutes the method of building the collector, however, is not protected by copyright, and
after reading the book, the copyright would not prevent the reader from actually building
the collector. Patent protection, however, could extend to the method of building the
collector and would prevent anyone from actually making or using the collector.
It is possible that the form of expression and underlying idea may merge when the
idea can be expressed in only one way. Such a merger may bar copyright protection be-
cause to allow protection would amount to copyright protection of an idea. See Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984) (merger of the form of expression and underlying idea in
computer software). See Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass
Communications World, 14 UCLA L. REv. 735 (1967) (discussion of the difficulty of separat-
ing the idea and expression of the idea).
101 HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 129, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
5745.
102 See supra notes 91, 93, 94 and accompanying text.
103 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1982)).
104 HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 129,1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5745.
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publication, and federal copyright law applied subsequent to publi-
cation of a protected work.' 0 5 This system was replaced by the 1976
Act, which establishes an automatic statutory copyright under federal
law once a work covered by the Act is created.' 0 6
For a work to be within the domain of copyright law certain cri-
teria must be met. The Constitution allows the law to extend copy-
right protection to all "writings" of an author. 10 7 This provision
probably stems from the original application of copyright to written
works, such as books. Courts, however, have construed writings lib-
erally to include all forms of writing, printing, engraving, and etch-
ing, 10 photographs, 0 9 motion pictures," l0 and even three-
dimensional objects."' The Supreme Court has stated that writings
"include any physical rendering of the fruits of the creative, intellec-
tual or aesthetic labor."' "12
This broad view of writings has been carried over into the Copy-
right Act, which extends protection to "works of authorship" rather
than simply to writings.' 13 The Act explicitly states that works of
authorship include: (1) literary works;' "4 (2) musical works, includ-
ing any accompanying words; 1 5 (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music;"1 6  (4) pantomines and choreographic
105 Id. Publication is defined as the distribution of the copyrighted work to the public
by rental, lending, sale, or other transfer of ownership. A mere public performance or
public display by itself does not amount to publication. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
106 HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 129, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5745.
107 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See generally I M. NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 1.08[A], at 1-44; HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 51, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5664.
108 Burrow-Giles Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
109 Id.
1 10 American Mutoscope and Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262, 266-67
(C.C.D.NJ. 1905).
1i1 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (statuette used as lamp base copyrightable).
112 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (writing should be broadly construed' and may include
recordings of artistic performance). See also Burrow-Gies, 111 U.S. at 58 (writings include
works not in existence at time Constitution enacted); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (cartoon characters are copyrightable).
113 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
114 Id. § 102(a)(l). Literary works are broadly defined to be "works, other than audio
visual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indi-
cia." Id. § 101. Literary works include computer programs. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at
1249. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) for a definition of "computer program" under the
Copyright Act.
115 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1982). A definition of musical works is not provided in the
Copyright Act because its definition is believed to be well settled. HOUSE REPORT 1476,
supra note 100, at 53, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5666-67. For a general discus-
sion of musical works protected by the Copyright Act, see I M. NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 2.05, at 2-53 to 2-58.
116 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3) (1982). Dramatic works are not defined in the Copyright
Act, but case law has established two essential requirements: (1) the work must relate a
story; and (2) the work must provide directions so that a substantial portion of the story
may be visually or audibly represented to an audience as actually occurring, rather than
merely being narrated or described. I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.06[A], at 2-60.
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works;' 17 (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;" 8 (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; 1 9 and (7) sound record-
ings.120 A careful reading of the Act makes it clear that these catego-
ries are merely illustrative, 12 1 although a broad interpretation of
these categories probably includes most works that conceivably qual-
ify for copyright protection. 122
To obtain copyright protection the work of authorship also must
be an original creation of the author in the sense that the work re-
sulted from the author's own intellectual effort and represents at
least a modicum of creativity. 123 Although the creativity require-
ment is minimal, trademarks, 124 blank charts for recording facts, 125
simple directions dictated by functional considerations,' 26 names, ti-
tles, or short phrases, 127 and computing devices, such as a slide
117 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (1982). Pantomimes and choreograhic works are not defined
in the Copyright Act or the legislative history. The legislative history, however, states that
social dance steps and simple routines are not choreographic works. HousE REPORT 1476,
supra note 100, at 54, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5667. For a discussion of
pantomimes and choreographic works as copyrightable subject matter, see Nimmer, The
Subject Matter of Copyright Under the Act of 1976, 24 UCLA L. REV. 978, 1011-15 (1977);
Comment, Moving to a New Beat: Copyright Protection for Choreographic Works, 24 UCLA L.
REV. 1287 (1977).
118 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1982). "Pictorial, graphic and sculptural works include two-
dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine graphic and applied art, photographs,
prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams and mod-
els." Id. § 101. If the work is a useful article, the copyrightable design must be separable
from the utilitarian aspect of the article.
119 Id. § 102(a)(6). "Audiovisual works are works that consist of a series of related
images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such
as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any." Id. § 101. "Motion pictures are audiovisual works consisting of a series of related
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with
accompanying sounds, if any." Id.
120 Id. § 102(a)(7). "Sound recordings are works that result from fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual works." Id. § 101.
121 Section 102(a) states that works of authorship include the categories discussed
supra in notes 114-20, and § 101 defines "including" to be only illustrative. 17 U.S.C.
.§§ 101, 102(a) (1982).
122 But see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (fully
developed literary characters are protectable apart from the stories in which they originally
appear). Such characters do not necessarily fall within the categories listed in 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1982).
123 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (1982) (originality requirement). See Universal Athletic Sales
Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Universal Athletic
Sales Co. v. Pinchok, 423 U.S. 863 (1975) (exceptional creativity or originality is not re-
quired; "a modicum of creativity may suffice").
124 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
125 Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See also
John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 515, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1983).
126 E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enters., Inc., 16 FR.D. 571, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (directions
that stated "Apply hook to wall" not copyrightable).
127 Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959).
See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR R32, Blank Forms and Other Works Not Protected by
Copyright (Mar. 1982); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR R34, Copyright Protection Not Avail-
able for Names, Titles or Short Phrases (Sept. 1982). But see Pattishall, Protection of Labels Through
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rule, 128 have all been determined to lack sufficient creativity to be
copyrightable.
It is important to distinguish this originality requirement from
the novelty requirement of patent law, which requires one to be the
first inventor of the patentable subject matter.' 29 Originality under
copyright merely requires that the author create the work of author-
ship independently without copying a preexisting work.13 0 Theoreti-
cally, several people could obtain copyrights on identical works of
authorship as long as each person created the work indepen-
dently. 131 This differs from patent law, which permits only one pat-
ent to issue for an invention. 132
Additionally, the original work of authorship must be fixed in
some tangible medium of expression. 133 This fixation requirement
is satisfied when the work is embodied in some physical form or de-
vice such as a book, videotape, photograph, or computer disk.' 34 An
otherwise copyrightable work, absent fixation, falls outside the Copy-
right Act and can be subject to state law135 because the Act preempts
only state laws or rights that affect works of authorship within the
domain of the Act.' 3 6
Once the work falls within the protection of the Act, a broad
array of rights,' 37 subject to certain explicit limitations, qualifica-
tions, and exemptions,' 38 accrue to the copyright owner. These
rights, explicitly listed in the Act, are the rights of: (1) reproduc-
tion;' 3 9 (2) adaptation; 140 (3) public distribution; 14 1 (4) public per-
Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition Laws, 56 TRADE-MARK REP. 408 (1966) (discuss-
ing label protection).
128 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR R33, Computing and Measuring Devices (Sept.
1978).
129 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1982). See also HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at
51, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5664 (originality requirement does not require
novelty). See also Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (copyright protects originality rather than
novelty).
130 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (origi-
nality means copyrighted work owes its origin to the author; originality is a prohibition
against copying).
131 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18.
132 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
'33 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
134 See HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 52-53, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5665-66. See Final Report, supra note 11, at 88.
135 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01[B][2][a], at 1-23.
136 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). With regard to preemption, see generally HOUSE REPORT
1476, supra note 100, at 130-34, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5746-49. See, e.g.,
Wainwright v. Crow, 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 89 (1984)
(copyright law preempts state criminal law action for selling bootleg recording of copy-
righted record albums).
137 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
138 Id. §§ 107-118.
139 Id. § 106(1).
140 Id. § 106(2).
141 Id. § 106(3).
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formance;14 2 and (5) public display. 143
The reproduction right allows the copyright owner to control
the reproduction of the protected work in copies or phonorecords,
which are defined to mean material objects embodying the copy-
righted work with some permanence.14 4 This right prohibits, for ex-
ample, the unauthorized photocopying of a copyrighted publication,
the recording of copyrighted television broadcasts, and the repro-
duction of a read only memory (ROM)' 4 5 which embodies a pro-
tected computer program.' 46 This right explicitly prohibits the
making of even a single, unauthorized copy. In addition, it is irrele-
vant whether the unauthorized copy is publicly used or merely made
and used in private, such as when a record is copied onto a cassette
tape.
Several distinct exceptions exist that allow reproductions that
otherwise would be infringing. Generally, libraries and archives may
make reproductions of copyrighted work, for limited purposes, with-
out permission. The copy must not be for commercial purposes, the
library must be open to the public, and the copy must include a no-
tice that the work is protected by copyright law.' 4 7 In the case of
certain phonorecords of musical works that are distributed publicly
in the United States, the copyright owner must provide a license for
reproduction in return for fixed royalty payments.' 48 The right to
control the reproduction of sound recordings is also limited because
it does not extend to the independent re-creation of the sounds. 4 9
Finally, the input of a computer program into a computer in vio-
lation of the reproduction right is not actionable, because such ac-
tion specifically is permitted when performed during the normal
utilization of a program. 150 This computer program exception is es-
142 Id. § 106(4).
143 Id. § 106(5).
144 For definitions of "copies" and "phonorecords," see id. § 101. Phonorecords in-
clude phonograph records, open-reel tape, cartridges, cassettes, and piano rolls. See also 2
M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.05[A], at 8-85 n.4.
145 A ROM is a small electronic device that produces specific outputs in response to
externally supplied data. These outputs result in the execution of certain instructions
within the computer.
146 See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249.
147 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
148 Id. § 115. The Copyright Act established the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to set the
amount of royalties. Id. §§ 801-810.
149 Id. § 114.
Sound recordings are works that result from the fixation of a series of musi-
cal, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as discs, tapes or other phonorecords, in which they
are embodied.
Id. § 101. In addition, commercial establishments that rent sound recordings for home
copying must pay royalties. Rental Record Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98
Stat. 1727 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 115 (1982)).
Is0 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). This exception, however, only applies to use of the pro-
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sential because the normal use of a program, such as one contained
on a floppy disk, requires copying of the program by a computer
before it can be used by the computer.' 5 '
The adaptation right allows the copyright owner to control the
transformation or adaptation of the copyrighted work into another
form. Typical examples would be turning a book into a motion pic-
ture, translating a literary work into another language, altering a mu-
sical arrangement by changes in the lyrics, or abridging a novel.' 52
This right, however, is limited for sound recordings.153 The adapta-
tion right for such recordings is limited to rearranging, remixing, or
otherwise altering the sequence or quality of the sounds. 154 Neither
independent re-creation of the sounds contained in a sound record-
ing nor use of sound recordings in certain educational radio and tel-
evision programs violates the adaptation right. 155 In addition, the
computer exception to the reproduction right applies equally to the
adaptation right, because a computer program often must be
adapted internally by a computer before it can be used by the
computer.' 56
Despite the broadness of the adaptation right, it must be noted
that a portion of the copyrighted work must be incorporated into the
new work for it to violate the adaptation right.157 Therefore, a movie
version of a novel may violate the adaptation right, but a musical
composition inspired by a novel ordinarily would not violate the
right, because it usually would not contain any part of the novel.' 58
Although the reproduction and adaptation rights overlap in many
cases, the adaptation right extends to one area outside the domain of
the reproduction right. To violate the reproduction right, the result-
ing reproduction must be fixed in some tangible form in a copy or
phonorecord.' 5 9 The adaptation right, however, does not have such
gram by the owner in the owner's computer. It does not permit the production of copies
of the program which are then provided to others for use in their computers. See Apple
Computer v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984)* Micro-Sparc, Inc. v.
Amtype Corp., 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 697, at 595 (D. Mass. Sept.
20, 1984).
151 See Final Report, supra note 11, at 62. Generally, computers use machine language
although computer programs are written in a higher level language. Therefore, the com-
puter must translate or convert the high level language into machine language before it
can utilize the program. This conversion constitutes the making of a copy that would vio-
late the reproduction right absent the exception contained in 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
152 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "derivative" works for the types of adap-
tations that are covered by the adaptation right).
153 Id. § 114.
154 Id. § 114(b).
155 Id.
156 Id. § 117.
157 HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 62, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5675.
158 See id.
159 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
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a fixation requirement. Therefore, a pantomime or improvised per-
formance based on a copyrighted work may violate the adaptation
right, but not the reproduction right. 160
Adapting copyrighted works into a new form is complicated by
the fact that the transformed work can be the subject of more than
one copyright. The creator of the original work owns a copyright on
the original work. If the owner of the copyright licenses someone
else to adapt or transform the original work, the licensee will have a
copyright in any new material added to the original underlying
work. 16 1 The owner, however, will still retain the copyright in the
original work. 162 A typical example occurs when an editor selects
and edits a group of literary works and reprints them in an anthology
with additional annotations about the works. The author of each lit-
erary work has a copyright in his or her work, and the editor has a
copyright that extends to the selection, editorial changes, and ar-
rangement of the works, and to the annotations incorporated into
the anthology. The editor's copyright, therefore, extends to the an-
thology as a whole, but not to the individual literary works contained
within.
The distribution right grants the copyright owner the exclusive
right to control the initial public distribution of copies or pho-
norecords of the protected work. 163 This control extends broadly to
the sale or other transfer of ownership and to the rental, leasing, or
lending of the copies or phonorecords to the public.164 Once copies
or phonorecords are distributed to the public by the copyright
owner, however, the "first sale doctrine" extinguishes the distribu-
tion right of the copyright owner with regard to those lawfully ob-
tained copies or phonorecords.' 65 These copies or phonorecords
may be sold freely or transferred to anyone without violating the
copyright owner's distribution right, although the other distinct
rights of the copyright owner remain intact. A typical example is the
purchase of a textbook. The purchaser is free to resell or dispose of
the textbook, because the distribution right of the copyright owner
has been extinguished. 166 Photocopying the book or incorporating
substantial portions of the book into another work, however, still
160 Id. § 106(2). See also definition of "derivative" works. Id. § 101.
161 Id. § 103.
162 Id. See generally HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 57-58, 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5670-71.
163 HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 62, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5675-76.
164 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982). Any unauthorized public distribution is a copyright
infringement. See HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 62, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5676.
165 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
166 See HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 79, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5693.
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would be copyright infringement, because the reproduction 6 7 and
adaptation 68 rights of the copyright owner remain in effect.
The performance right entitles the copyright owner to control
public performances' 6 9 of copyrighted literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomines, motion pictures, and other
audiovisual works. It is important to note that this performance right
is more limited than the other rights discussed because it applies
only to the categories listed above.' 70 Copyrighted material that falls
outside these categories is not subject to protection under the per-
formance right. 171
The performance right restricts only public performances, not
private performances. Otherwise, every time a commercially
purchased prerecorded videotape was played, the performance right
would be violated. Because this would be counterproductive, the
right is limited explicitly to public performances. The performance
right, however, would be violated if a prerecorded videocassette was
purchased and played in a public place, because this would be a pub-
lic performance. 172
Numerous exemptions and limitations narrow the scope of the
performance right. Performance of a copyrighted work by teachers
or students in a face-to-face classroom setting of a nonprofit institu-
tion is not violative of the performance right. 173 Educational broad-
casts of nondramatic literary or musical works directed to
government employees or classrooms for disabled persons unable to
attend traditional classrooms also are not barred by the performance
right.174 Religious institutions are specifically exempted from cover-
age by the performance right when certain types of literary or musi-
cal works are performed in the course of services at a place of
worship or religious assembly. 175 Nondramatic musical works may
be performed freely at annual agricultural and horticultural fairs,' 76
and in stores for the sole purpose of promoting the sale of copies
167 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
168 Id. § 106(2).
169 Id. § 101 (defining a public performance).
170 Id. § 106(3).
171 See, e.g., id. § 114(a) (performance right does not apply to sound recording).
172 At least one commentator feels that the focus of "public" is not necessarily the size
or location of the audience, but rather the availability of the copyrighted work to the public
with the intent that members of the public will then perform the work, to the disadvantage
of the copyright owner, even if such performance is in private. On this basis, public com-
panies that rent prerecorded videocassettes may be liable for violation of the performance
right as a consequence of their rental and subsequent use of the cassettes by individual
customers. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.14[C], at 8-143 to 8-144.
173 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1982).
'74 Id. § 110(2).
175 Id. § 110(3). See generally HOUSE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 84-85, 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5698-99.
176 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (1982).
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and phonorecords of the work. 177 Nondramatic literary works may
be broadcast freely if done primarily for handicapped persons and
without commercial motives.' 78 Additionally, this exception extends
to dramatic literary works performed for blind persons.' 79
Both nondramatic literary and musical works may be performed
in the presence of any audience under the following circumstances.
The performance must not have a commercial purpose; the perform-
ers, organizers, and promoters must not be compensated; and there
must not be an admission charge or alternatively, the admission
charge must be used for educational, religious, or charitable pur-
poses if not objected to by the copyright owner.180 In all cases, how-
ever, nondramatic literary and musical works may be performed as
part of a social function before a nonprofit veterans or fraternal or-
ganization if the public is not invited and the proceeds of the per-
formance are used exclusively for a charitable purpose.'18 The 1976
Copyright Act also provides that some otherwise infringing perform-
ances are subject to compulsory licenses so that the copyright owner
is remunerated for use of the performance right, but cannot bar such
exercise of the right. Public or educational broadcasters are entitled
to a compulsory license to broadcast nondramatic musical works.' 82
The Act also provides a compulsory license for the performance of
phonorecords in a jukebox.' 83
Generally, the receiving and rebroadcast of radio or television
signals, referred to as a "secondary transmission," is not a copyright
violation if the local signal is merely transmitted at no charge to vari-
ous private rooms of hotel guests or apartment house residents.' 84
Such a secondary transmission to the public or even to a select
group, such as a closed circuit cable television broadcast to a theatre,
however, violates the performance right of the copyright owner.185
In the case of cable systems, local signals may be rebroadcast freely
as a secondary transmission, while nonlocal signals may be rebroad-
cast only under a compulsory license.' 86
Finally, a copyright owner is entitled to the right to publicly dis-
play187 literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomines, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including in-
177 Id. § 110(7).
178 Id. § 110(8).
179 Id. § 110(9).
180 Id. § 110(4).
181 Id. § 110(10).
182 Id. § 118 (parties must agree on license royalties or they are determined by the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal).
183 Id. § 116.
184 Id. § 111.
185 Id.
186 Id. § I11(d).
187 See id. § 101 for definitions of "display" and to "publicly display."
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dividual images of a motion picture, or other audiovisual works. De-
spite the display right, the lawful owner of a copyrighted work may
freely display that work to viewers at the location of the copy pro-
vided the display does not amount to a secondary transmission. 188
The exemptions from the performance right for face-to-face teach-
ing activities' 89 and the performance of certain literary and musical
works in the course of educational broadcasts' 90 or in the course of
religious services' 9 1 also apply to the display right. The secondary
transmission exemptions discussed above with regard to the per-
formance right and the right to a compulsory license for cable sys-
tems apply equally to the display right.' 92
In addition to the various limitations of a copyright owner's
rights already discussed, a major exception to the rights of the copy-
right owner is the "fair use doctrine."193 This judicially created doc-
trine, which was explicitly codified in the 1976 Copyright Act,
provides that the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, perform-
ance, and display rights may be exercised with regard to copyrighted
material for "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or research,"
provided such use is a fair use. 194 The underlying rationale of this
doctrine recognizes that situations exist where copying should be al-
lowed to prevent inhibiting the purpose of copyright, which is to en-
rich the public. 195 Additionally, the fair use doctrine provides a
means of resolving conflicts between the copyright law, which re-
stricts expression of an idea, and the first amendment, which grants
freedom of speech.196
The Act lists the following factors to be evaluated in determin-
ing fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
188 Id. § 109(b). Section 109(b) was redesignated § 109(c) by Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98
Stat. 1727 (1984).
189 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1982).
190 Id. § 110(2).
'91 Id. § 110(3).
192 Id. § 111.
93 Id. § 107.
194 Id. The legislative history of the Act indicates that quotation of excerpts in a re-
view or criticism for purposes of illustration, quotation of short passages in scholarly
works for clarification of the author's observation, or reproduction of materials for educa-
tional purposes may all be fair uses of copyrighted works. See HouSE REPORT 1476, supra
note 100, at 65-66, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5678-79. See also Guidelines for
Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions, reprinted in id. at 68-74, 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5681-88.
195 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196 See Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp.
957, 960 (D.N.H. 1978); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554,
560 (D.D.C. 1981).
19851
560 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 10
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.1 97
It is clear from the Act that the above factors should always be con-
sidered, although additional factors may also be examined in an ap-
propriate case. 19 8 Inclusion of the fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act
merely codified existing case law that interpreted and applied this
judicially created doctrine. 19 9 The open-ended nature of the codifi-
cation, which requires the evaluation of at least the four factors listed
above, makes it clear that fair use "cannot be determined by resort to
arbitrary rules or fixed criteria," but rather, that each case must be
examined on its own facts.2
0 0
Rights afforded by the Copyright Act arise automatically upon
the creation and fixation of an original work of authorship within the
domain of the Copyright Act. Initially, these rights are vested in the
author or joint authors if the work resulted from the work of several
persons.2 0 ' When the work is made for hire, however, the employer
or person for whom the work was created is considered to be the
author, and therefore, the copyright automatically vests in the em-
ployer or person for whom the work is made, absent an express writ-
197 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
198 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A], at 13-56 to 13-57 & nn.15, 16.
199 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
1174 (5th Cir. 1980); HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 66, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5680. See also Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 791 n.29, 806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200 Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977). One very recent and well-
known application of the fair use doctrine involved the "Betamax case" in which the
Supreme Court determined that the videorecording of copyrighted television shows for
the purpose of time-shifting amounted to a fair use. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 779 (time-shifting
defined to be practice of videorecording programs to view once at a later time and then
erasing them).
The Court reached its conclusion by looking at the four factors enumerated in the Act.
See supra note 197 and accompanying text. The Court determined that recording for pri-
vate home use was a noncommercial, nonprofit activity that merely enabled a viewer to
select an alternative viewing time for a work that the viewer was already invited to view free
of charge, and there was no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for the copy-
righted programs. The Court also noted that the fact that a work was recorded in its
entirety was not relevant under the circumstances of this case. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 792-93.
But see Quinto, 506 F. Supp. at 560 (reprinting 92% of story precludes claim to fair use
defense). The significance of Sony becomes apparent in view of the fact that over twelve
million videorecorder units have been sold in the last five years. An estimated twenty-five
million will be sold by the end of 1986. Paris, Coming Distractions, FORBES,July 16, 1984, at
46.
201 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). A joint work requires an intent by the joint authors to
merge their respective contributions into a single work at the time of creation of the con-
tributions. The joint authors do not have to work together, and their contributions need
not be equal. Id. § 101 (defining "joint work"). Each joint author is considered a tenant-
in-common of the joint work. Each can unilaterally use or grant a nonexclusive license in
the work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other joint authors with regard to their
share of the proceeds. HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 100, at 121, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5736.
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ten agreement to the contrary. 20 2
The Copyright Act grants equal rights to authors regardless of
nationality when the work is unpublished-not made available to the
public. 20 3 If a work is published, however, a foreign author is not
entitled to protection unless the author is domiciled in the United
States at the time of first publication, the author is a domiciliary of a
country that is party to a copyright treaty of which the United States
is also a party, the work is first published in the United States or in a
foreign country that is a party to the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, the work is first published by the Organization of American
States or the United Nations, or the work is covered by a Presidential
proclamation. 20 4
Although copyright protection is automatic and generally lasts
for the life of the author plus fifty years, 20 5 the Act requires that a
special notice of copyright be placed on all publicly distributed cop-
ies of the copyrighted work to entitle the owner to claim copyright
protection. 20 6 The notice generally consists of three elements:
(1) "Copyright," "Copr.," or "@;"
(2) the name of the copyright owner; and
(3) the year of first publication. 20 7
In the case of sound recordings the notice placed on the pho-
norecords must be identical to the normal copyright notice except
that 'to' is used in place of "Copyright," "Copr.," or ,,©.-208
The Copyright Act also provides for deposit of a copyrighted
work with the United States Copyright Office, which is part of the
Library of Congress. 20 9 The Act specifically requires that two com-
plete copies of the copyrighted work be deposited with the Copy-
right Office within three months of public distribution of the
work.210 Failure to make this mandatory deposit, however, does not
202 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
203 Id. § 104(a). See id. § 101 for a definition of "publication."
204 Id. § 104(b).
205 Id. § 302(a). For a joint work the term is the life of the last surviving author plus
fifty years. Id. § 302(b). For works made for hire, anonymous works and pseudonymous
works the term is seventy-five years from the date of publication or one hundred years
from the date of creation, whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c).
206 Id. § 401(a).
207 Id. § 401(b). The date can be omitted in some cases for pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works. See id. § 401(b)(2).
208 Id. § 402. The symbol '0' was adopted as the international symbol for protection
of sound recordings by the "Phonograms Convention" at Geneva on October 29, 1971.
Some sound recordings may contain both a sound recording notice and a conventional
copyright notice when copyright is claimed in both the sound recording and, for example,
the printed text or art work appearing on the phonorecord. See HousE REPORT 1476, supra
note 100, at 145, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 5761.
209 The address for the Copyright Office is: Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20559.
210 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1982). The copies are deposited for the use of the Library of
Congress. Id. § 407(b). The Copyright Office, by regulation, can alter deposit require-
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affect one's rights under the copyright law. The only penalty in-




In addition to the deposit requirements, the Act provides for
permissive registration of a copyright. 21 2 A copyright must be regis-
tered or registration must have been applied for and refused by the
copyright office before a copyright infringement action may be
brought.21 3 Several reasons exist, however, for registering a copy-
right prior to bringing suit. If registration is made prior to or within
five years of the first publication of the work, the registration is prima
facie evidence of the validity of the copyright. 214 Also, the recovery
of attorney's fees 21 5 and statutory damages 2 16 in lieu of actual dam-
ages is limited if early registration is not accomplished.2 1
7
Once a valid copyright exists, violation of the rights accruing to
the owner may be enforced by an action brought in a United States
district court.218 To establish a cause of action, the copyright owner
must prove that copyright protection exists. He has to satisfy the
requirements of the Act by showing that the work is an original work
of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression that comes
within the domain of the Act. 219 The copyright owner also must
prove ownership of the copyright by showing either authorship or a
valid transfer of ownership from the author.220 The copyright owner
then has the burden to prove that the infringing work was copied
from the copyright owner's work.22' Because actual copying usually
is impossible to prove, normally the copyright owner must prove
only that the defendant viewed or had the opportunity to view the
ments. Id. § 407(c). See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1983) (requires only first and
last twenty-five pages of a computer program to be deposited, together with the page con-
taining a copyright notice).
211 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (1982).
212 Id. § 408.
213 Id. § 411.
214 Id. § 410(c).
215 Id. § 505 (court can award attorney's fees at its discretion).
216 Id. § 504(c) (copyright owner can elect to receive statutory damages in lieu of ac-
tual damages and profits. The amount of statutory damages must be at least $250 but not
more than $10,000, with the actual amount set by what the court deems to be just. The
court has the discretion to increase the award up to $50,000 if willful infringement is
found).
217 Registration is easily and inexpensively accomplished by completing short, easy-to-
understand forms provided by the Copyright Office, which are then submitted by mail with
appropriate copies of the work.
218 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982) (district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of copyright matters).
219 Copyright registration, however, within five years of first publication establishes
prima facie validity of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
220 Transfer can be for the copyright or limited to only some of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner. Id. § 101. A valid transfer must be in writing and recorded in the
Copyright Office to establish copyright ownership. Id. §§ 204(a), 205(d).
221 Selle v. Gibb, 567 F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (N.D. Il. 1983).
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copyright owner's work and that substantial similarities exist be-
tween the works. 222 Once the copyright owner meets the burden of
proof, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case shifts to the de-
fendant. The defendant generally will prevail only if he can show
authorized copying 223 or can negate the evidence of copying by
showing independent creation of the allegedly infringing work. If
the copyright owner prevails in an infringement action, he may be
entitled to injunctive relief,224 destruction of the infringing materi-
als,2 25 actual damages and profits226 or prescribed statutory dam-
ages, 22 7 attorney's fees,228 and costs of the suit.2 29
The Copyright Act, like the patent law, is without extraterritorial
effect. Copyright infringement that occurs outside the United States
is not actionable under the United States Copyright Act.23 0 Unlike
the patent law, however, several international copyright conventions
and treaties enable a work of authorship created by a United States
national to be protected in both the United States and most foreign
countries without any special filing or registration of the copyright
either in the United States or abroad. 23 ' Protection in foreign coun-
222 A showing of substantial similarity may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of infringement when the similarity between the two works is striking and substantial.
Champion Map Corp. v. Twin Printing Co., 350 F. Supp. 1332, 1336 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
223 Authorized copying would occur if defendant had permission to copy the work, or
if one of the exceptions, such as fair use, permitted copying.
224 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
225 Id. § 503(b).
226 Id. § 504(b).
227 Id. § 504.
228 Id. § 505.
229 Id.
230 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 17.02, at 17-5.
231 The major international copyright treaty is the Universal Copyright Convention, of
which the United States is a signatory. It provides that each member country must provide
the same protection to U.S. authors as provided by each country to its own nationals. The
full text of this Convention is found in Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6
U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324.
The Buenos Aires Convention provides copyright protection for U.S. nationals in
member countries provided an appropriate U.S. copyright notice plus the phrase "All
Rights Reserved" is used on published copies of the copyrighted work. The full text of
this Convention is reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at app. 28.
The Universal Copyright Convention abrogates the need to rely on the Buenos Aires
Convention in all but a few South American countries. See Rinaldo, The Scope of Copyright
Protection in the United States Under Existing Inter-American Relations: Abrogation of the Need for
United States Protection Under the Buenos Aires Convention by Reliance upon the UCC, 22 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y 417 (1975).
See 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at app. 20 for a list of countries that extend copyright
protection to American nationals. See generally id. § 17.04, at 17-9 to 17-22 for a detailed
discussion of foreign copyright rights extended to foreign authors.
The other major copyright treaty, of which the United States is not a signatory, is the
Berne Convention. This treaty, originally signed in 1886, has been revised numerous
times. See 4 id. at app. 27 for the most recent version of this Convention. Although the
United States is not a member of this Convention, most major countries have signed the
original Convention or a subsequent revision. See id. at app. 22 for a list of member
countries to the Berne Convention. Protection for U.S. nationals, however, can be ob-
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tries that are members of these international conventions and trea-
ties is in accordance with the national laws of each particular country.
Most foreign copyright laws, however, protect the same subject mat-
ter as United States law.23 2 The rights granted by foreign copyright
laws are generally equivalent to the rights under the United States
Copyright Act with the exception of the public display right, which is
not recognized in most countries. 233
It is therefore possible for a United States author to obtain auto-
matic copyright protection throughout most of the world. To incur
broad foreign protection, however, a copyright notice that includes
the following elements should be placed on all published copies of
the work:
(1) "©;"
(2) the name of the copyright owner;
(3) the year of first publication; and
(4) "All rights reserved." '234
Both domestic and foreign copyright protection is easily ob-
tained for minimal cost, thus making it a very desirable form of pro-
tection. These benefits, however, must be balanced against the
degree of protection afforded, because the copyright owner's rights
are limited to protection of the form of expression. Any underlying
idea contained in the copyrighted work is not subject to copyright
protection, and copyright provides protection only against copying a
work of authorship. Independent creation of the same or similar
works do not violate a copyright. Therefore, it should be recognized
tained under the Berne Convention if the work is first published in a member country or if
the work is simultaneously published in the United States and a member country. See gener-
ally 3 id. § 17.04[D], at 17-11 to 17-20. Berne Convention coverage, however, is not neces-
sary for most new works since most major countries, including the United States, are
signatories of the Universal Copyright Convention.
232 One exception is sound recordings, which are covered by United States copyright
law but not the Universal Copyright Convention. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 7.07[B],
at 7-22 n.12. This deficiency has been partially corrected by the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phono-
grams. See 4 id. at app. 23 for a list of countries that have ratified this Convention.
233 3 id. § 17.09, at 17-36.
234 It should be noted that the Universal Copyright Convention only recognizes the
symbol "©" and not the alternative forms of "Copyright" or "Copr." allowed in the
United States. The Universal Copyright Convention does not require the use of a copy-
right notice, but rather it permits the copyright notice to be a substitute for any formali-
ties, such as deposit and registration or first publication in the nation in which protection
is sought, which may be required by a foreign nation that is a member of the Universal
Copyright Convention. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 7.07[B], at 7-21 to 7-24. Most
major European nations do not require any formalities as a condition of copyright; but see
id. § 7.07[B], at 7-23 n. 17 for a partial list of member countries that require formalities.
Use of the Universal Copyright Convention notice fully satisfies the formalities required by
these countries.
The phrase "All Rights Reserved" ensures compliance with the Buenos Aires Conven-
tion, and therefore, provides protection in the few countries that are members of the Bue-
nos Aires Convention but not the Universal Copyright Convention. 3 id. § 17.04[C], at 17-
11.
[VOL. 10
1985] PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
that while copyright is the easiest type of intellectual property pro-
tection to obtain, the extent of such protection is limited.
IV. Trade Secret Law
Secret industrial and business "know-how, ' 2 35 commonly re-
ferred to as trade secrets, are protected by judicially created trade
secret law.2 36 This body of state common law is premised on the
belief that inventions, unique methods of doing business, customer
lists, and any other proprietary information that is used secretly and
that gives a business a competitive advantage in the marketplace
should be protected. 23 7 The protection, however, does not protect
the actual subject matter per se, but rather, prohibits illegal or
wrongful appropriation or disclosure of the subject matter. 238 De-
spite the common-law basis of trade secret law, a high degree of uni-
formity has been achieved by the courts of the industrial states. 239
The Restatement (First) of Torts240 has become the source of trade se-
cret law followed, in whole or in part, in most jurisdictions. 24'
Initially it must be determined that the subject matter in ques-
tion is appropriate information or know-how within the definition of
a trade secret to obtain trade secret protection. 242 Although Judge
Friendly has stated that a trade secret is "any unpatented idea which
may be used for industrial or commercial purposes, ' 243 the most fre-
quently relied on definition is contained in the Restatement (First) of
Torts section 757 comment b (1939):
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compi-
235 This know-how does not have to possess the degree of novelty required by patent
law. Some minimal degree of novelty must exist, however, for the know-how to be a trade
secret. The extent of the novelty may be sufficient if it shows that the information is not a
matter of public knowledge. See CPG Prod. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q. 206, 213
(S.D. Ohio 1981); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410,422 (E.D. Pa.
1980). See also Cataphote, 444 F.2d at 1315 (trade secret must have at least a modicum of
originality).
236 See 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 9.03[l], at 9-65 (trade secret law domain of
state common law). Some states, however, have adopted statutes to deal with trade
secrets. See, e.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 1-11, 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980).
237 E.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953) (almost any knowl-
edge or information that is kept secret and used to conduct a business qualifies as a trade
secret). See, e.g., Zoecon Indus. v. American Stockmen Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th
Cir. 1983) (customer lists are protectable as trade secrets). See generally Kewanee, 416 U.S.
at 482 ("the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of
invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law").
238 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475-76.
239 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 9.03[l], at 9-65.
240 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 757 comment b.
241 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 9.03[1], at 9-65. For a listing of cases following
the RESTATEMENT, see 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 2.01 n.2, at 2-3 to 2-10.
242 Smith, 203 F.2d at 373.
243 Painton & Co. v. Boums, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 222 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Sin-
clair v. Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 220, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (Ct. App.
1974) (court said Judge Friendly's definition was in harmony with definition in RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 1, at § 757 comment b).
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lation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical com-
pound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials,
a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers....
Generally it relates to the production of goods as, for example, a
machine or formula for the production of an article. It may, how-
ever, relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the busi-
ness, such as a code for determining discounts, rebates or other
concessions in a price list or catalog, or a list of specialized custom-
ers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office management ...
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. . . so that, ex-
cept by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in ac-
quiring the information.
2 4 4
Despite the explicit Restatement definition, the drafters realized
that it was impossible to provide an exact definition of a trade secret,
and therefore, they listed the following factors to be considered in
determining whether information is a trade secret:
24 5
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside the
trade secret owner's business;
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others in-
volved in the owner's business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the owner to guard the se-
crecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the owner and to
competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the owner in
developing the information; and
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others. 246
To qualify for trade secret protection, the information must not
be widely known outside the owner's business,2 47 and it must be in-
formation that enhances the business.24 8 Knowledge of the informa-
tion should be restricted to employees who have a legitimate
244 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 757 comment b.
245 Id.
246 Id. In Forest Laboratories v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1971), and
Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chem. Corp., 33 Wis.2d 445, 463-64, 147 N.W.2d 529, 538-
39 (1967), each court stated that these factors should be examined when determining if a
trade secret exists. See also Arnold, Trial Tactics in Trade Secrets Cases (Protecting Trade
Secrets 1983) 157 P.L.I. PAT., COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND LIT. PROP. HANDBOOK SERIES
11, 17-26 (1983) (12 factors to evaluate in determining existence of a trade secret).
247 The information must be kept secret and must not be known outside the trade
secret owner's business. Underwater Storage, 371 F.2d at 954 (once trade secret is disclosed,
the rest of the world may have right to use it). See also Packard Instrument Co. v. Reich, 213
U.S.P.Q. 322, 327 (I11. App. Ct. 1980) (even though process kept secret, it is not trade
secret if process is known and used by outside world).
248 Cheme Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Minn. 1979)
(information must provide a competitive advantage).
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business reason to be exposed to the proprietary information, 249 and
such employees should be subject to a nondisclosure agreement that
legally obligates them not to disclose the information as a condition
of employment. 250 Many nondisclosure agreements also contain re-
strictive covenants that limit an employee's ability to compete with
his employer if the employee goes to work for himself or another
former employer.25' The owner of the proprietary information
should also take precautions to prevent employees not subject to a
nondisclosure agreement from gaining access to the information and
should prevent access to the information by persons outside the
business. 252 In some instances these precautions should even ex-
tend to preventing access to trash. Information unearthed in a com-
pany's trash may amount to disclosure of the proprietary
information, and consequently, may extinguish the trade secret
protection. 253
In addition to establishing information as a trade secret, the
owner of the information must undertake continuous measures to
maintain the secrecy of the information.2 54 Employees must be re-
minded that information is a trade secret and must be maintained as
a trade secret for the benefit of the employer.2 55 Such efforts to
maintain secrecy are critical because trade secret protection will end
249 See Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. 272, 277 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (re-
striction of confidential reports to employees who needed access to them was a key secur-
ity precaution).
250 See generally Pretty, A Comprehensive Program of Precautions To Forestall Loss of Trade
Secret (Protecting Trade Secrets 1983) 157 P.L.I. PAT., COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND LIT.
PROP. HANDBOOK SERIES 167, 181-94 (1983) (general discussion of employee nondisclo-
sure agreements). For nondisclosure agreements approved by the courts, see Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 917 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Syntex, 214 U.S.P.Q. at
274.
251 Such restrictive covenants must be reasonable, however, and will be scrutinized by
courts to balance the right of an employee to market his skills freely against the right of an
employer to protect trade secrets. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1965); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v.Johnson, 219
U.S.P.Q 458, 461-65 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1981).
252 See Texas Urethane, Inc. v. Seacrest Marine Corp., 403 F. Supp. 612, 617 (S.D.
Tex. 1975) (to preserve secrecy, materials delivered by supplier color-coded without iden-
tification of materials).
253 Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v.Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So.2d 43, 49-50 (Ala. 1983) (question
of fact under the circumstances if putting trade secret information in a trash bin is aban-
donment of the trade secret). But see Tennant Co. v. Advance Machine Co., 355 N.W.2d
720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (one-half of a million dollars in damages awarded to plaintiff in
response to defendant finding plaintiff's confidential information by rummaging through
plaintiff's trash bin).
254 Absolute secrecy is not required. Rather, reasonable measures to maintain secrecy
must be undertaken. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012,
1017 (5th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff was not required to take precautions against aerial surveil-
lance to protect trade secrets, because such precautions would be unreasonable).
255 See National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 152 U.S.P.Q 120, 134 (Mo. 1966) (having
employees sign covenants not to compete and warning of existence of trade secrets are
factors in determining if adequate security precautions necessary to establish a trade secret
have been taken).
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once the protected information is no longer secret.2 56
Although many trade secrets are used only within a single com-
pany, it is sometimes advantageous for the trade secret owner to dis-
close the information to someone outside the company. This may be
the case, for example, when a company develops a trade secret but
lacks the capability to exploit it commercially. 257 Also, in some cases
a trade secret has value only if it can be licensed to other companies
for use in their businesses. This latter situation would arise, for ex-
ample, when a computer program designed for a limited market is
created. 258 To meet the need for disclosure without destruction of
trade secret status, disclosure is allowed if it is in confidence and
both parties understand that a confidential relationship exists re-
garding the information.2 59 Although a written agreement establish-
ing a confidential relationship is not required,260 it generally is
advisable to execute such an agreement. This is important because a
confidential relationship can be established only by agreement of
both parties. A written agreement is evidence that both parties have
consented to such a relationship. 26'
The amount of licensing or confidential disclosure of a trade se-
cret may affect its status. The extent of disclosure may equal a public
disclosure that vitiates trade secret protection at some point.262 The
measures taken to maintain secrecy, however, generally are more im-
256 Underwater Storage, 371 F.2d at 954; Packard Instrument, 213 U.S.P.Q at 327.
257 Arnold, Basic Considerations in Licensing, in THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING 2A-
74 to 2A-75 (R. Goldscheider & T. Arnold ed. 1981).
258 See Management Science Am., Inc. v. Cyborg Sys., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 921 (N.D. 11. 1978).
259 See id. at 922 n. 1 (disclosure of the software, subject to a confidential agreement, to
more than 1,300 customers did not necessarily destroy confidential nature of the
software).
260 Zoecon, 713 F.2d at 1178 (in employment relationship a confidential relationship
may be implied by nature of the relationship).
261 J. Irizarry y Puente v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 248 F.2d 799, 802
(1st Cir. 1957) (unsolicited letter sent to defendant by plaintiff, which disclosed plaintiff's
idea, did not establish confidential relationship between plaintiff and defendant); Laughlin
Filter Corp. v. Bird Machine Co., 319 Mass. 287,289-90, 65 N.E.2d 545,546 (1946) (confi-
dential relationship cannot be thrust upon someone merely because proprietary informa-
tion is involved).
In addition, a nondisclosure agreement puts an employee on notice that trade secrets
are involved. Eastern Marble Prod. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 229, 232
(Mass. 1977). Also, acknowledgment by an employee in a nondisclosure agreement that
certain trade secrets were not previously known may help undermine a later claim that the
trade secrets were not secret information. See Kodekey Elecs., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486
F.2d 449, 455 (10th Cir. 1973); Rapco Foam, Inc. v. Scientific Application, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 1027, 1029-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
262 Secrecy can be maintained despite wide dissemination of trade secrets provided
such secrets are disclosed in confidence. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Christie G & S Co.,
198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1904). At some point, however, the amount of confidential disclo-
sure must equal public disclosure. Otherwise, it is theoretically possible for information
confidentially licensed to every member of the public, to simultaneously constitute a trade
secret and public information. The amount of confidential disclosure that will equal pub-
lic disclosure is unclear because the issue has not been squarely addressed by the courts.
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portant with regard to maintaining information as a trade secret than
the number of parties who have learned of the information in
confidence.263
Once information is subject to trade secret protection, the dura-
tion of such protection is potentially infinite, provided appropriate
actions to maintain secrecy continue. 264 Because the basis of trade
secret law rests on protecting the owner of proprietary information
from wrongful appropriation of the information by others, two oc-
currences can easily defeat protection. First, anyone who lawfully ob-
tains a product or device embodying a trade secret is free to
disassemble the device and determine how it operates. This process,
often called reverse engineering, 265 may permit a competitor to dis-
cover the trade secret, which the competitor is then free to use. 266
Second, someone may independently invent or discover the trade se-
cret and be free to use or publicly disclose it.267
Trade secret protection also may be lost when proprietary infor-
mation is obtained illegally by industrial espionage, disclosed by a
former employee or disclosed in breach of a confidential agreement.
In such cases an action may be brought against the party responsible
for wrongfully obtaining or disclosing the proprietary informa-
tion,268 but once the information is publicly disclosed, trade secret
status is lost.269
As a general rule, the following must be shown to prevail in a
suit for misappropriation of a trade secret:270
(1) the existence of a trade secret; 27 t
263 Compare Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 114
(Del. Ch. 1975) (dissemination of confidential diagrams to 6,000 people does not destroy
secrecy provided such disclosure is in confidence), with Crown Indus., Inc. v. Kawneer Co.,
335 F. Supp. 749, 761 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (unrestricted disclosure of trade secret to a third
party on a nonconfidential basis can destroy trade secret protection).
264 Cataphone, 422 F.2d 1290, on remand, 316 F. Supp. 1122, af'd, 444 F.2d 1313 (trade
secret protected from illegal misappropriation for as long as kept secret); Aktiebolaget
Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (property right in unpatented
trade secret exists as long as owner does not disclose secret).
265 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
266 Id. Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally and in the Mass
Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 233 (1982).
267 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
268 1 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, § 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4.
269 Id. at 3-6; Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475 (trade secret cannot be information that is
public knowledge or general knowledge in the trade or business); Underwater Storage, 371
F.2d at 954 (once trade secret disclosed the rest of the world may have right to use it).
270 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 4.01, at 4-1 to 4-2.
271 "The first issue to be determined in every trade secret case is not whether there
was a confidential relationship or breach of contract . . . but whether, in fact, there was a
trade secret to be misappropriated." Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 327,
191 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1972). See also Frodge v. United States, 180 U.S.P.Q. 583, 587 (Ct.
Cl. 1974); Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 56 Mich. App. 335, 224 N.W.2d 80 (1974). This is very
important because judicial opinions often focus so heavily on the confidential relationship
that a reader might assume the breach of a confidential relationship by itself is actionable
absent the existence of a trade secret.
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(2) a relationship between the parties that provides an opportu-
nity for the owner's trade secret to be communicated to another
party;
(3) actual knowledge of the trade secret by the other party;
(4) knowledge of the other party that the trade secret is proprie-
tary information that is valuable to the owner and is not to be used
outside the relationship; and
(5) use or disclosure of the trade secret by the other party that
results in potential or actual damage to the owner.
Actions for misappropriation of a trade secret usually take the
form of contract or tort actions. If the employee has executed an
express agreement not to disclose proprietary information, any
wrongful disclosure usually will be treated as a breach of contract,
and contract law will control an action brought by the employer
against the employee. 272 When no express contract exists courts will
either establish an implied contract and apply contract principles 273
or focus on the breach of a confidential relationship, which usually is
viewed as a tort action. 274 Although either a contract or tort theory
will support an action, the particular designation significantly affects
the procedural rights of the parties 275 and the available remedies. 276
Actions against former employees may not be worthwhile if the
employees are essentially judgment proof, because their net worth is
minimal compared to the value of the trade secret. In such a case it
may be desirable to seek redress against the company that is now
wrongfully using the trade secret after acquiring it from the former
employee. An action against the company would be based on the
economic tort of interference with contractual relations. 277 This
cause of action requires a showing that a third party enticed the for-
mer employee to breach a contractual obligation not to reveal trade
secrets. 278
272 See F. JAGER, 1984 TRADE SECRET LAW HANDBOOK 47 (1984).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 53. The tort theory is followed by the RESTATEMENT. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, at § 757 and accompanying comments.
275 For example, different conflict of laws rules and different statutes of limitations
may apply depending upon characterization of the action as a tort or contract action. F.
JAGER, supra note 272, at 55. The right to trial by jury may also depend upon whether the
action is based on contract or tort. 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 7.03[2], at 7-27.
276 Punitive damages may be available under a tort theory but not under a contract
theory. 12A R. MILGRIM, supa note 17, § 7.03[2], at 7-27.
277 Id. at 7-26. See PROSSER & KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 129 (5th ed.
1984) (general discussion of the tort of interference with contractual relations).
278 This action generally requires: (I) existence of contract between plaintiff and third
parties; (2) knowledge of this contract by defendant; (3) intentional unjustified inducement
by defendant to breach this contract; (4) a subsequent breach of the contract by the third
party; and (5) resulting damages to plaintiff. Walt Peabody Advertising Serv., Inc. v.
Pecora, 393 F. Supp. 328, 331 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
It may be advisable in many cases to notify employers of former employees that these
employees possess knowledge of trade secrets and are subject to nondisclosure agree-
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Although courts recognize the importance of protecting trade
secrets, they balance this protection against the rights of employees
to practice their trades or professions freely. Attempting to resolve
this tension, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated:
The law is well settled that an employee upon terminating his em-
ployment may carry away and use the general skill and knowledge
acquired during the course of the employment.
But it is equally well established that out of the relationship of em-
ployer and employee certain obligations arise, including that which
precludes an employee from using, for his own advantage or that of
a rival and to the harm of his employer, confidential information that
he has gained in the course of his employment.
279
Therefore, courts may not construe trade secrets so broadly as to
prevent former employees from working in their fields of expertise
for other employers. 280
Relief for misappropriation of proprietary information typically
is in the form of an injunction. 28' Halting the use of the information
by someone other than the owner can preserve the secrecy of the
information,282 thus protecting the trade secret and any economic
value it has. 283
A preliminary injunction may be sought immediately when mis-
appropriation of a trade secret is discovered to minimize compromis-
ing the secrecy of the proprietary information. Obtaining a
preliminary injunction generally requires:
(1) a showing that suggests the existence of a trade secret;
(2) a showing that defendant learned of the trade secret in a con-
fidential relationship with plaintiff;
(3) a showing that the trade secret is being used or is about to be
used in a manner detrimental to plaintiff; and
(4) a showing that the result of this detrimental use is likely to
injure plaintiff in a way that cannot be readily converted to monetary
damages. 284
ments, so that in an action for interference with contractual relations the subsequent em-
ployer cannot assert lack of knowledge of the existence of a contractual confidential
relationship.
279 Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 78, 67 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1946).
280 See generally Hahn & Clay v. A.O. Smith Corp., 212 F. Supp. 22, 31 (S.D. Tex. 1962)
(secrecy agreement must be construed to cover only methods and processes that are secret
and confidential); Mostek v. Inmos, Ltd., 303 U.S.P.Q. 383, 389 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (secrecy
agreement does not prevent former employee from using skills and talents acquired or
enhanced while working for former employer).
281 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 7.08[1], at 7-178.
282 Id. at 7-181 to 7-182 (injunction may be against misappropriator of trade secret or
in some cases against the third party using the trade secret).
283 See Underwater Storage, 371 F.2d at 954 (once secrecy is vitiated, the trade secret
vanishes). -
284 12A R. MILORIM, supra note 17, § 9.03[9], at 9-100 to 9-101. The usual rules for
obtaining a preliminary injunction apply in the case of misappropriated trade secrets, id. at
§ 7.08, at 7-178 n.2, although courts may grant injunctions more readily in the case of
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Following a final judicial decision that proprietary information
was wrongfully disclosed or used, an injunction often may be ob-
tained to bar use of the information by the party who wrongfully ob-
tained it for the period of time that would be required for
independent development of the information. 28 5 Damages also may
be available in lieu of2 86 or in addition to injunctive relief.2 87 The
measure of damages in most cases is either the damages suffered by
the trade secret owner as a result of the wrongful disclosure or use of
the trade secret, or the profits or other benefits reaped by the de-
fendant in using the proprietary information.288 In addition, puni-
tive damages may be awarded when the wrongful appropriation or
disclosure was particularly egregious. 289 Unlike patent and copy-
right infringement, attorney's fees generally are not available for
trade secret misappropriation, because damages are determined by
state common law principles that do not allow awards of attorney's
fees absent a statute directing such an award. 290
Although trade secret law is highly developed in the United
States, foreign trade secret law is less developed, less uniform, and
subject to many uncertainties. 29 1 In the United States, trade secrets
include almost any technological or commercial information that is
used secretly in a business to provide a commercial advantage over
competitors. 292 Recent Australian case law seems to follow this ap-
proach by explicitly relying on and adopting the Restatement defini-
trade secret misappropriation than in other contexts due to the destruction of all eco-
nomic value of a trade secret that can result from prolonged public exposure. See generally
id. at § 9.03(9], at 9-100 to 9-101.
285 Brunswick, 79 Ill.2d at 477, 404 N.E.2d at 207. See also 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note
17, § 7.08[1], at 7-185 n.12. A longer injunction may be granted in appropriate cases. See
id. at 7-188 n.12.2.
286 Kubik, 56 Mich. App. at 350, 224 N.W.2d at 95 (injunctive relief denied but dam-
ages allowed); Walker Employment Serv., Inc. v. Parkhurst, 300 Minn. 264, 268, 273, 219
N.W.2d 437, 439, 442 (1974) (damages available even though injunctive relief
unavailable).
287 E.g., Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 95 (both injunction and damages awarded against de-
fendants who breached both their covenants not to compete and their obligation not to
disclose confidential information); Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 105,
314 A.2d 296, 298-99 (1974) (injunction and damages allowable).
288 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 7.08[3], at 7-229 to 7-231. See generally Annot.,
11 A.L.R.4th 12 (1981).
289 Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (7th Cir.
1973); Mann v. Tatge Chem. Co., 201 Kan. 326, 339, 440 P.2d 640, 650 (1968) (fraud,
oppression or wanton disregard required to support award of punitive damages).
290 See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) (allows award of attorney's fees in exceptional patent
cases); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982) (allows award of attorney's fees in copyright infringement
suits at the discretion of the court).
291 Jorda, supra note 1, at 209. This may be partially related to the failure of most
foreign case law to be reported. See Note, Research Sources in International and Commercial
Law, 9 N.CJ. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 319 (1984) (most foreign jurisdictions only publish a
fraction of the number ofjudicial opinions published in the United States).
292 See supra notes 237, 243 and accompanying text.
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tion of a trade secret.2 93
Other countries, however, have differentiated between industrial
or manufacturing secrets, such as methods, processes, formulas, or
manufacturing systems, and commercial trade secrets, such as cus-
tomer lists, price lists, advertising methods, and financial data.2 94
France protects manufacturing secrets by statutory criminal law, 29 5
while commercial secrets are protected by an action for unfair com-
petition.2 96 Germany,2 97 Italy,298 and Switzerland 299 recognize both
industrial and commercial secrets, but do not differentiate between
them in terms of legal protection.
England has long recognized protection for trade secrets. Eng-
lish case law, however, has gone beyond American law30 0 by recog-
nizing confidential information as protectable even if the information
is not secret.30 This treatment of confidential information is similar
to American law in that it focuses on a breach of confidentiality as
being legally actionable, but the information does not have to be se-
cret.30 2 In other countries, such as Taiwan and India, there is a total
dearth of statutory or case law authority with regard to trade
secrets.303 Japan, a major economic and technological country, pro-
vides practically no trade secret protection.30 4
As a general rule, most secret information used by a business to
maintain an advantage over competitors is potentially protectable by
trade secret law both in the United States and abroad. The trade
secret definition provided by the Restatement of Torts is the standard
used by most American courts to ascertain the existence of a trade
secret,30 5 but the definition and extent of protection of trade secrets
varies in foreign countries.
293 Mesne & Ampere Elec. Mfg. v. Milenkovic, [1973] Vict. R. 784 (1972) (Australian
court); reprinted in 1 A. WISE, TRADE SECRETS AND KNOW-How THROUGHOUT THE WORLD,
app. II at 3-159 to 3-186 (1981 rev.); Ansell Rubber Co. v. Allied Rubber Indus. Ltd.,
[1967] Vict. R. 37 (1966) (Australian court), reprinted in 1 A. WISE, supra note 293, app. I at
3-137 to 3-157.
294 See, e.g., Jorda, supra note 1, at 246-48 (France differentiates between "secrets de
fabrique," which are industrial secrets, and "secrets de commerce," which are commercial
secrets).
295 Id. at 246.
296 See id. at 247; 3 A. WISE, supra note 293, § 3.01[5], at 3-27 n.68.
297 3 A. WISE, supra note 293, § 4.01[l], at 4-9 to 4-10, and § 4.01[l][d], [e], at 4-16 to
4-18.
298 4 A. WISE, supra note 293, § 5.01[l], [2], at 5-7 to 5-8.
299 Id. § 8.01, at 8-5.
300 See generally 2 A. WISE, supra note 293, § 2.02, at 2-11 to 2-21.
301 Id. § 2.03, at 2-23 to 2-29.
302 See id. English law will protect confidential information even if it is not secret.
American law, however, requires secrecy. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
303 1 A. WISE, supra note 293, §§ 4.01 to 4.02, at 4-3 to 4-5 (Taiwan); id. § 2.01, at 2-3
(India).
304 Jorda, supra note l,.at 221. See also CPG PIrod., 502 F. Supp. at 44 (court noted that
trade secret protection not available in Mexico).
305 See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
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V. Patent, Copyright, or Trade Secret Protection-Which is the
Best?
The distinctions and similarities between patent, copyright, and
trade secret protection must be understood so that the appropriate
form of protection will be used in a particular case. In addition, it is
important to understand how patent, copyright, and trade secret
protection may overlap or be used simultaneously in some cases.
Trade secret law provides protection under statutory and state
common law30 6 for most secret industrial and commercial informa-
tion that is not generally known and that is used in a business to
acquire a competitive advantage. 30 7 The broad scope of trade secret
law includes subject matter within the domain of patent protec-
tion. 30 8 The main thrust of trade secret law is to protect secret busi-
ness information from wrongful misappropriation, rather than to
prevent use of the information if it is acquired by reverse engineer-
ing or independent development. 3 09 Unlike patent and copyright,
the duration of trade secret protection can be infinite provided the
information is used in secrecy, and no one lawfully discovers it.310
Patent protection is purely statutory and is limited to embodi-
ments of an invention or discovery that fall within specifically defined
statutory categories. 3 1' These categories are much narrower in
scope than the broad range of information that can be protected as
trade secrets. 31 2 In addition, strict tests of patentability must be sat-
isfied during the lengthy process of seeking a grant of patent protec-
tion.3 13 Although patent law does not provide protection until a
patent is issued, upon issuance the patent owner has an absolute
right to prevent anyone from making, using, or selling the patented
invention in the United States for a specified time.3 14 Unlike trade
secret protection, which requires actual use of the information in a
business, 31 5 the grant of a patent confers absolute rights without re-
gard to use of the invention. In fact, many patents are merely "paper
patents" because the patented inventions have never actually been
306 See supra note 236.
307 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
308 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482-91 (trade secret law can be used to protect both patenta-
ble and unpatentable subject matter).
309 Id. at 475-76.
310 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
31' 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (to be patentable invention must be "new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof'). For a discussion of these statutory categories, see supra notes 42-45 and accom-
panying text.
312 See Smith, 203 F.2d at 373 (almost any information or knowledge that is kept secret
and used to conduct a business qualifies as a trade secret).
313 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982). See also Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476-78.
314 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
315 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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constructed.3 16 This does not affect the rights of the patent owner,
however, who can still use the patent to prevent use of the invention.
Copyright protection, which is a function of federal law, arises
automatically upon the creation of an original work of authorship
that is permanently fixed in some tangible medium of expression.3
1 7
This is distinctly different from trade secret protection, which re-
quires extensive secrecy precautions,3 18 or patent protection, which
requires lengthy and costly administrative proceedings to secure
protection.31 9 Copyright protection typically has a long lifetime3 20
and merely requires the inclusion of a simple copyright notice on
published works to inform the world that copyright is claimed in the
work.32' Despite the duration and ease of obtaining copyright pro-
tection, the extent of protection is limited. Copyright only prevents
others from copying the form of expression of the protected work, as
opposed to patent and trade secret protection, which extend protec-
tion to the underlying idea.3 2 2 Also, copyright does not prohibit in-
dependent creation of the same or similar work by another
author.3 23
The overlapping coverage of some subject matter by trade se-
cret and patent law allows an inventor to make an election between
the two types of protection.3 24 In some circumstances the two types
of protection also may be used together. The Patent and Trademark
Office maintains all patent proceedings in complete secrecy 32 5 and
reveals information about the proceedings only if the patent is is-
sued. Therefore, prior to the issuance of a patent the invention can
be maintained as a trade secret. This allows the inventor to continue
trade secret protection in the event a patent is denied. Although
trade secret and patent protection cannot be used for the same sub-
ject matter, because the full disclosure accompanying issuance of a
patent vitiates any claim to secrecy, different related components or
aspects of an invention may be protectable by different methods.326
316 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
317 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
318 See supra notes 247, 254-56 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
320 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
321 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (1982).
322 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (distinction between patent and copy-
right protection). See also supra notes 238, 264-67 and accompanying text (trade secret law
protects an underlying idea from misappropriation but not from reverse engineering or
independent development).
323 See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
324 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 8.02[1], at 8-3. It should also be noted that some
works of authorship, such as certain works of art, may be protected by a design patent or
by copyright. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 201. Both design patent and copyright protection may be
obtained simultaneously in the same work. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1393 (C.C.P.A.
1974).
325 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982).
326 See, e.g., Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1269 n.10 (9th Cir.
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The ultimate decision to rely on trade secret or patent protec-
tion in an appropriate case depends upon many factors.3 27 If the
invention is used in a mass-marketed product and can be discovered
easily by reverse engineering, patent protection may be the only
practical means of protection. If a standard product made by a novel
method is indistinguishable from the same product made by well-
known methods, however, trade secret protection may be desirable.
The projected life of the product is also relevant because the length
of patent protection is limited, while trade secret protection is infi-
nite if secrecy is maintained.3 2s
The type of market available for the product is also important.
A limited market lends itself to relying on trade secret protection by
confidentially licensing the product to customers. 329 A mass-mar-
keted product may not be compatible with such an approach, and
therefore, patent protection may be preferable. The likelihood of
independent invention or discovery by a competitor is another im-
portant consideration because this would destroy trade secret pro-
tection but not patent protection.3 30 In addition, the type of
technology involved is significant. In areas such as electronics, new
ideas or products may become obsolete before lengthy patent pro-
ceedings are completed. The difficulty of maintaining secrecy is an-
other critical factor because the continued maintenance of trade
secret protection requires the existence of secrecy.
The lack of uniformity in the application of the patent law by the
judiciary has caused many companies to resort to trade secret law. In
addition, courts have shown a propensity to invalidate patents in
suits to enforce rights arising from an issued patent.33' In contrast,
the courts have shown a tendency to uphold trade secret rights.332
1978) (although product patented, method of manufacture could be trade secret); Rein-
forced Earth Co. v. Neumann, 201 U.S.P.Q. 205, 207, 208, 211 (D. Md. 1978) (earth wall
retaining system patented, but computations, plans, methods, and designs to implement
system for particular project were trade secrets).
327 See, e.g., Leuzzi, Process Inventions: Trade Secret or Patent Protection, 66 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'v 159 (1984) (discussing whether to use patent or trade secret law to protect process
inventions).
328 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (17 years of protection for utility and plant pat-
ents) with United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (inventor
may keep invention secret and reap its benefits indefinitely).
329 See, e.g., Management Science, 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (Callaghan) 922 n. 1 (propri-
etary software confidentially licensed to more than 1,300 customers).
330 Although Coca-Cola is a widely marketed product, its formula has been maintained
as a trade secret for many years because it defies analysis. W. KONOID, supra note 69, at 8 1;
12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 5.04[2], at 5-91 n.12.
33' 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 9.02[91[b][i], at 9-53 (courts have invalidated
more than 75% of litigated patents in the past). This situation may change, however, now
that all patent appeals are heard by a single federal appeals court as opposed to the prior
system where the various U.S. courts of appeals heard patent appeals from the district
courts within their circuits. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
332 See 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 9.03[7], at 9-97 (stating belief that trade se-
cret rights are upheld at least 75% of the time).
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The coincident use of trade secret and copyright protection has
been explicitly upheld because copyright extends only to the expres-
sion used by the author while trade secret protection extends to the
underlying idea.3 3 3 Typically, this joint use is accomplished by place-
ment of copyright notices on confidential information such as com-
pany manuals or software that are used internally or licensed only on
a confidential basis. Trade secrecy is then relied on to protect the
underlying idea contained in the information. If the information
subsequently is injected into the public domain, however, copyright
protection may be used to protect the expression of the underlying
idea.
It is clear that the appropriate type of protection depends upon
the subject matter involved and the circumstances in which it will be
used. Some information may be protected by either patent law or
trade secrecy, while other information may be protectable only as a
trade secret. When only the expression of an idea must be protected
copyright may be sufficient, while in other cases, copyright and trade
secret may be used concurrently.
VI. Conclusion
The protection of intellectual property is an old idea based on
the premise that specific legal rights will spur discovery and creation
of scientific and artistic advances. This protection is especially im-
portant today in high technology fields, such as electronics, where
companies are reluctant to invest heavily in research and develop-
ment absent some form of protection.
The patent law provides a powerful type of protection for many
new inventions or discoveries, but such protection is limited to spe-
cific statutory classes. The problems arising from a lack of uniform
interpretation and application of the patent law by different courts
should be alleviated by the vesting of jurisdiction for all patent ap-
peals in a single court.
Copyright provides automatic protection once an original work
of authorship is created and fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion, but the extent of protection is very limited. The rights arising
under copyright law also are subject to numerous explicit statutory
limitations and exceptions. In addition, the fair use exception per-
mits certain uses of protected works to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis to determine if they are permissible uses.
Trade secret protection, a product of common law, protects the
333 Warrington Assoc. v. Real-Time Eng. Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. I11. 1981).
See also Technicon Medical Information Sys. v. Green -Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983); Warrington Assoc. v. Kellogg Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 215 U.S.P.Q. 375 (E.D. Wisc. 1981).
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sanctity of secret information used in a business to gain an advantage
over competitors.
A final consideration with regard to protecting intellectual prop-
erty is the need for worldwide protection. Patent protection must be
applied for in each country in which protection is desired. Although
similar protection is afforded by the patent law of most countries,
differences exist. Copyright protection also is controlled by the na-
tional law of each country, but international agreements allow pro-
tection to be obtained automatically in most major countries. Trade
secret law, while recognized in varying degrees in almost every coun-
try, is not highly developed outside the United States. It is clear
nonetheless that intellectual property law is an important form of
legal protection that can benefit businesses in both domestic and in-
ternational markets when used effectively.
